[EM] New Criterion: The Co-operation/Defection Criterion
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Mon Oct 24 16:59:06 PDT 2011
--- En date de : Lun 24.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com> a écrit :
> Co-operation/Defection Criterion (CD):
>
> Premise:
>
> A majority prefer A and B to everyone else, and the rest of
> the voters all prefer everyone else to A and B.
>
> Candidate A is the Condorcet candidate
>
> Voting is sincere except that the B voters (voters
> preferring B to everyone) else refuse to vote A over anyone.
>
>
> Requirement:
>
> The Condorcet candidate wins.
>
> [end of CD definition]
>
> I’m only aware of one method that meets CD: MMPO.
You wrote:
it seems like a combination
of SDSC and SFC.
endquote
It has things in common with them, but it's much more difficult to comply
with than SFC is.
You wrote:
Basically A will have a majority over B
endquote
Not necessarily. A will certainly have a pairwise win over B. When the non {A,B}
candidates lose, and MMPO is applied to its A,B tie, that pairwise win will mean
that B has a greater pairwise opposition than A does.
You wrote:
, and B will
have a majority over third candidate C (if there are only three)
endquote
Correct. And if there are more than three candidates,then B will have majority pairwise
opposition against each of them.
You wrote
, and
A will not have a voted majority over C. A might even lose to C (unless
"Condorcet candidate" is defined on cast votes), but it won't be by a
majority.
endquote
Correct. But A and B will get the same pairwise opposition from C.
You wrote:
In this scenario, SDSC prevents C from winning and SFC prevents B from
winning.
endquote
SFC doesn't apply to A and B, because there's no majority voting A (the Condorcet candidate) over
B.
You wrote:
I'm assuming cast ballots look something like this:
48 C>A
~26 A>B
~26 B (sincere is B>A)
Is this wrong?
endquote
That looks right. It meets CD's premise.
In that example, A has a majority defeat against B. But A's status as Condorcet candidate, and the sincere
voting, only guarantee that A has a pair-win against B. But that's all MMPO needs for A to win.
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