[EM] Let MMPO solve its ties. It elects A in the example. The simplest is the best

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Mike,

--- En date de : Sam 22.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com> a écrit :


De: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
Objet: [EM] Let MMPO solve its ties. It elects A in the example. The simplest is the best
À: election-methods at electorama.com
Date: Samedi 22 octobre 2011, 15h42





Kevin--
 
You wrote:
 
What do you make of this example under MMPO:
 
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
 
There is no CW. Standard MMPO returns a tie between B and C. If you remove A,
C is both the CW and MMPO winner. Do you think this can be accepted?
 
[end quote]
 
Yes. Because, as I define it, MMPO chooses C.  I define MMPO as solving its own ties. I suggest that
MMPO's ties be solved by MMPO.

Yes, but what will you say when someone asks how it can possibly be that C is
a better winner than A? A has more first preferences, and neither has any lower
preferences. The only difference is that C voters listed a second preference.
 
Is it better to elect a weak candidate, over a majority-defeated one? (I call C "weak"
because C apparently could never win the Approval version of this election.)
 
Kevin
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20111025/cfbfdf6b/attachment-0002.htm>