[EM] [CES #3845] condorcet & range voting -- which one yields more condorcet winners?

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Jameson,

--- En date de : Mer 12.10.11, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com> a écrit :




 

Maybe you should do sims first, emit flames second.


That's a fair criticism, and one I continue to violate in this message. I wonder if Kevin Venzke has any sims which speak to this question.
 
 
Thanks for remembering me. The question is sincere Condorcet efficiency between 
Range and something like MCA? I have three scenarios on-hand (two 1D, one
spectrumless, all three-candidate) and MCA is a bit better than (four-slot) Range in
all three. But it is rare that either method has the efficiency of a Condorcet method.
 
My sims use 100% strategic voters and polling by the way.
 
A few comparisons.
Spectrumless (blocs have random preferences):
IRV 92.2% (of trials with a CW)
WV 91.7%
MCA 90.6%
Range 90.3%
Approval 88.4% (note that Range doesn't quite become Approval due to the voters
being divided into a fairly small number of strategizing blocs)
FPP 84.8%
 
1D with random candidate positions:
WV 99.1%
IRV 98.4%
MCA 97.9%
Range 97.6%
Approval 96.5%
FPP 84.0%
 
1D with random candidate positions but distance from center halved (center-heavy):

WV 97.8%
IRV 97.3%
MCA 96.9%
Range 95.7%
Approval 93.2%
FPP 76.6%
 
Note that the voters have the ability to get what they want a high percentage of the
time no matter the method. But they may have to compromise or use other strategies
in order to do it. For instance...
 
Here are the percentage of elections in which at least a quarter of the voters ended up
compromising (favorite betrayal). The three figures follow the order of the scenarios 
above.
 
WV 0.4%, .02%, 0% of elections
IRV 9.3%, 4.6%, 5.7%
MCA 0%, 0%, 0%
Range 0%, 0%, 0%
Approval 0%, 0%, 0%
FPP 17.4%, 17.3%, 18.7%
 
I could have produced other figures as well, such as the rather alarming burial rate
under WV. But the point is just that the Condorcet efficiency with strategic voters,
this single figure, doesn't tell a complete story.
 
Another point is that I'm not using one cookie-cutter strategy for all methods here.
The voters' strategy is deduced by AI, not by me.
 
I do realize I need to get around to making more of my work available.
 
Kevin
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