[EM] [CES #3849] condorcet & range voting -- which one yields more condorcet winners?
Jameson Quinn
jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Wed Oct 12 11:16:52 PDT 2011
2011/10/12 Clay Shentrup <clay at electology.org>
> On Wednesday, October 12, 2011 1:04:13 AM UTC-7, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>> In that sim, Range elected 13279/29999 CWs, and Median elected
>> 12472/29999. This is a significant difference, but not a huge one. On the
>> other hand are two effects:
>> 1. Range's greater strategy incentive
>> 2. The tendency for voters to polarize, giving exactly one of the two
>> frontrunners an *honest* rating near zero. This is a *separate* effect
>> from strategic exaggeration. If true, this tendency increases the
>> probability that an honest median vote is strategically strongest, but does
>> not do as much for Range.
>>
>
> These are both not true. The strategy with MJ is to polarize, to maximize
> the chance that (if your score is the median) you increase or decrease it as
> much as possible (up to or down to the next closest score).
>
Warren and I had a long technical discussion about strategy incentive in MJ
versus range. He did some clever calculations, and I picked holes in them,
and we repeated it for several rounds. At the end we hadn't quite completely
converged on a consensus, but we both agreed that Range had a greater
strategy incentive than MJ. That result seems more robust than a bald
assertion from you.
The point is, even with zero information on a particular candidate, you have
a pretty good historical benchmark for the median scores of the first and
second place candidates. Outside of that range, you have a safe leeway to be
honest. And many voters (more than chance) have strong enough opinions about
the frontrunners that they already honestly straddle that range.
> And it seems that MJ reacts much worse to such plausible behaviors.
>
??? What are you even talking about? If everyone exaggerates, MJ and range
are identical; they're both approval. And if a fixed X% of voters
exaggerate, it has a bigger effect on Range than MJ; that's an implication
Warren's result that I mentioned above. So you're 180 degrees wrong here.
>
> Why do these myths about strategy resistance with MJ persist?
>
>>
No comment.
Jameson
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