[EM] Proportional, Accountable, Local (PAL) representation: isn't this a big deal?

[Andy Jennings]

On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 11:56 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:

>
>
> 2011/10/25 Andy Jennings <elections at jenningsstory.com>
>
>> Hi Jameson,
>>
>> I looked over it.  I didn't see any technical problems immediately, but
>> I'm going to try to re-read it a few more times and keep thinking it over.
>>  My emotional response, though, is that it's probably beyond the complexity
>> limit for actual implementation anytime soon.  The idea that "candidates
>> from your district are in a bigger font and candidates outside your
>> co-districts aren't listed at all but you can write them in" is a clever
>> trick, but I don't know if people will go for it.
>>
>
> (Note: I've renamed "co-district" as "super-district")
>
> The super-district idea and ballot design are not fundamental. For
> simplicity, it would work fine if only the candidates from your local
> district were available, as long as you could write-in candidates from other
> districts.
>
>
>> Clarification on terminology: When you say "Fair Representation", is that
>> the same thing as "Fair Majority Voting"?
>>
>
> Yes. Oops. I'd already fixed this error on the page.
>
>
>> - I know "Fair Majority Voting" from here:
>> http://mathaware.org/mam/08/EliminateGerrymandering.pdf
>> - I know Balinski has a more complicated system that allows multiple
>> winners per district.  I forget what it's called, biproportional
>> apportionment, maybe?
>>
>
> Don't know that one. Can you find a link?
>

Here are some references:

Michel Balinski, “Apportionment : uni- and bi-dimensional,” in B. Simeone et
F. Pukelsheim (Eds.), Mathematics
and Democracy. Recent Advances in Voting Systems and Collective Choice,
Springer, Berlin and Heidelberg, 2006,
43-53.
(Paywalled: http://www.springerlink.com/content/g21l8t2t12p4n14l/)

Michel Balinski and Friedrich Pukelsheim, “Die Mathematik der doppelten
Gerechtigkeit,” Spektrum der
Wissenschaft, April 2007, 76-80.
(In German: http://www.math.uni-augsburg.de/stochastik/pukelsheim/2007a.pdf)

Michel Balinski and Friedrich Pukelsheim, “Matrices and politics,” in E. P.
Liski, J. Isotalo, S. Puntanen and G. P.
H. Styan (Eds.), Festschrift for Tarmo Pukkila, Department of Mathematics,
Statistics and Philosophy, University of
Tampere, Finland, 2006, 233-242.
(http://www.math.uni-augsburg.de/stochastik/pukelsheim/2006d.pdf)



>
>
>> - When I hear "Fair Representation", I think of his book with Young (
>> http://books.google.com/books?id=eBFNzSeAv_sC) which is all about
>> congressional apportionment, not about PR or voting systems.
>>
>
> Sorry, mistake.
>
>
>
>>
>> More general questions:
>>
>> What are your main priorities here?  Just to find some way to use the SODA
>> ballot for a PR election?  Do you see locality as a must-have or as a
>> nice-to-have that also decreases the complexity of the ballot?
>>
>
> The main priority is to make a proportional system which can use the
> existing district structure, but doesn't suffer from FMV's flaws (see next
> section below)
>
>
>>
>> What advantages does this have over straight FMV?  Just that it uses a
>> SODA ballot?  The fact that you are almost certain to have a representative
>> of your own party?
>>
>
>  Compared to straight FMV, this has 4 advantages. In descending importance:
> 1. In FMV, a minority candidate can beat a majority candidate in that same
> district. In PAL, there is a "chain of custody" of the delegated votes, so
> you can see that each winner has attained exactly the same quota of votes.
> 2. FMV gives too much power to the parties. A vote for one candidate from
> party X is assumed to be equivalent to voting for any other candidate from
> that party. In PAL, both candidates and voters have some recourse to be able
> to vote for party X but not candidate Y in that party. (Voter recourse is
> the purpose of using the SODA ballot. If the SODA ballot were considered too
> complex, I'd consider just write-ins to be an acceptable, though inferior,
> substitute; because with full choice, you could probably find a candidate
> whose preferences were close enough to yours.)
> 3. As you say, PAL lets you track which representative from your party is
> "yours".
> 4. PAL lets votes for unsuccessful parties be reassigned to larger parties.
>
> I consider 1 and 2 above to be important enough to design a new system.
> Yes, 1 is only symbolic, really; but it's a doozy. I can't imagine
> convincing a majority to support FMV in spite of this simple opposition
> talking point. Also, note that fixing 2 makes the fix for 1 more than just
> symbolic.
>
>>
>> Why not just use straight FMV with a "districting" step for each party
>> afterwards?  For example, say we use FMV and party A gets 5 seats, party B
>> gets 4 seats, and party C gets 1 seat.  We take a clean map and divide it
>> into five regions so that there are an equal number of A voters in each
>> region.  Those are the districts for party A voters.  Take another clean map
>> and divide it into four regions so there are an equal number of B voters in
>> each region, and those are the districts for the party B voters.  The party
>> C map doesn't get divided up because they all are represented by the one
>> seated C candidate.
>>
>
> That would work to fix issue 3 above, but it seems to me more complicated
> than my system. It is also a more radical change, especially from the
> perspective of an incumbent. Also, it's more unlike FMV, which is the only
> PR system legal under current federal law.
>
>
>>
>> Maybe you could use some kind of weighted Vonoroi to choose the districts
>> so that the districts cluster around the homes of the seated representatives
>> from that party.  Or maybe you would use splitline or some other districting
>> method.  Or maybe you let each party decide how to divide up their map
>> themselves.  I'm hoping there wouldn't be much gerrymandering because these
>> "party districts" don't affect future elections in any way.  They're just
>> done so you can show people "if you voted for party A, then look at this map
>> to see who your party A representative is."
>>
>
> This would work. Again, it only fixes issue 3.
>
>
>>
>> Or maybe you don't care that the number of A voters is exactly the same in
>> each of party A's regions, then you can just agglomerate the legislative
>> districts into relatively balanced co-districts.
>>
>
> That's basically what PAL does.
>
>
>>
>> Andy
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 5:32 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>> Yesterday I posted two messages to the Election Methods list about PAL
>>> representation <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation>, a
>>> new PR system designed as a replacement for single-member districts. The
>>> system combines elements from STV, Balinski's "Fair Representation", and
>>> SODA.
>>>
>>> Basically nothing in the system as I described it was in itself a new
>>> idea. My goal was not to create an innovative system, but to blend existing
>>> ideas to find a proportional system that would be acceptable to all existing
>>> interests, including voters, theorists/activists like us, incumbent
>>> politicians, and parties.
>>>
>>> I believe that a system like this is *the only kind of PR that could
>>> pass* in a US environment, and also well-suited to the UK. I'm a little
>>> discouraged that a development I regard as truly important got no comment
>>> from the list.
>>>
>>> So I'm writing another message. My excuse is that I've thought of one
>>> additional rule for the system, a way to make a party threshold that's
>>> fair to independent candidates<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation#Optional_party_threshold>.
>>> Also, I've expanded and rewritten the article (included at bottom here).
>>>
>>> Why could no other system PR system pass in the US? (These arguments also
>>> might apply to other single-member-district countries such as the UK or
>>> Australia, but I can't say for sure.)
>>>
>>>    - A closed list system would be (rightly) attacked as a power grab by
>>>    party bureaucrats. Voters have been souring on parties for decades now, and
>>>    they wouldn't stand for that.
>>>    - A global open-list system such as STV would have
>>>    unacceptably-complex ballots. Who can keep track of dozens of candidates,
>>>    let alone fully rank them?
>>>    - A districtless system would be too radical a change. People are
>>>    used to having "their" representative.
>>>       - Note that PAL has one representative per party for each
>>>       district. Each representative is associated with multiple districts. So your
>>>       representative is the one from your party from your district. If you voted
>>>       for a party that got no seats, your vote was probably transferred to a
>>>       "backup" party according to a preference order you assented to, so you still
>>>       probably have a representative. ("probably" because up to a Droop quota of
>>>       voters have no representative.)
>>>    - A multimember-district system helps with the above problems, but
>>>    doesn't actually solve them. Who wants a system where ballots are only a
>>>    little bit too complex, where you only sort of know who your representative
>>>    is, and which is only mostly proportional?
>>>    - A mixed member system is an ugly hybrid. To me, US democratic
>>>    ideals are too egalitarian to accept that there could be two different kinds
>>>    of representative.
>>>    - More seriously, a mixed member system would be totally unacceptable
>>>    to existing incumbents, as it would draw too many of them out of their
>>>    existing districts. And I actually think this is in part a valid concern.
>>>    The public interest is to have representatives who are accountable, not
>>>    complacent; but I see no value in change for change's sake.
>>>    - Balinski's "Fair Majority Voting<http://mathaware.org/mam/08/EliminateGerrymandering.pdf>",
>>>    as used in Belgian municipal elections, resolves all of the concerns above,
>>>    but it would be very hard to justify the fact that some representatives
>>>    would lose with a majority vote. It's very hard to respond to a simple
>>>    question like "Why should my opponent win with 45%, when I lose with 52%?"
>>>    with a complex answer about party balance and compensating for
>>>    gerrymandering.
>>>       - Note that PAL representation would actually give the same result
>>>       as FMV, but would provide an easy justification for that result. Responding
>>>       to the question above, you could say: "Each representative needs exactly the
>>>       same number of votes to win. Your opponent got the vote transfers they
>>>       needed to reach that threshold and you didn't. Those votes were transferred
>>>       in accordance with the explicit will of the voters, and to ignore them would
>>>       be to disenfranchise those voters."
>>>
>>> (Random note: I did the math for how many people in the US would be part
>>> of the unrepresented leftover droop quotas in a state-by-state PR system.
>>> The answer is around 20%. If you assume that most elected representatives
>>> got a bit more than the quota, so that the unrepresented fragment is only
>>> 2/3 the size of the represented fragments (in line with a 60% average margin
>>> in single-member districts; the actual US average varies between 60-70%),
>>> then 18% would be unrepresented nationwide. If the unrepresented fragment is
>>> 1/2 the size of the represented one, 16% would be unrepresented nationwide.)
>>>
>>> .........
>>>
>>> *Here's the current version of the electorama article<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation> on
>>> PAL representation:*
>>>
>>>  PAL (Proportional, Accountable, Local) representation is a system for
>>> electing a proportionally-representative legislature. It's designed to be a
>>> gentle change from a single-member-district system; districts can remain
>>> unchanged, and *if single-member districts are giving fair proportions
>>> from cohesive parties, PAL representation will elect exactly the same
>>> members*. The difference is that most representatives will represent
>>> multiple districts, and each district will have multiple representatives
>>> (one from each winning party). This allows each voter to know who their
>>> representative is, while preserving ballot secrecy. Thus, whereas currently
>>> only 60-70% of US voters voted for their representative, and many of those
>>> because they have no real choice, with PAL voting over 80% overall, and over
>>> 95% in large states, would be guaranteed have a representative whom they'd
>>> supported directly or indirectly.
>>>
>>> The basic idea is:
>>>
>>>    - Candidates pre-announce their rank-ordering of the parties
>>>    (starting with their own party) and may optionally approve/disapprove within
>>>    each party candidates. Their votes will never be transferred to disapproved
>>>    candidates.
>>>    - Voters may vote on the candidates in their or nearby districts, or
>>>    write in candidates from farther off. Votes are delegated by default but
>>>    optionally, voters may refuse to delegate or vote approval-style.
>>>    - Each delegated ballot is transformed into the pre-announced vote of
>>>    the candidate it supports.
>>>    - A legislature is elected by a version of STV<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/STV> (with
>>>    fractional transfers and a Droop quota.)
>>>    - Each district "drafts" one member of each elected party from the
>>>    elected slate.
>>>    - Your representative is the member of the party you voted for who is
>>>    representing your district.
>>>
>>>  Contents [hide]
>>>
>>>    - 1 Full Procedure<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation#Full_Procedure>
>>>       - 1.1 Optional party threshold<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation#Optional_party_threshold>
>>>    - 2 Sample Ballot<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation#Sample_Ballot>
>>>    - 3 Example<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation#Example>
>>>    - 4 Advantages<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation#Advantages>
>>>       - 4.1 P <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation#P>
>>>       - 4.2 A <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation#A>
>>>       - 4.3 L <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation#L>
>>>    - 5 Justification<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation#Justification>
>>>
>>> [edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=PAL_representation&action=edit&section=1>
>>> ]Full Procedure
>>>
>>>    - Candidates pre-announce their rank-ordering of the parties
>>>    (starting with their own party) and may optionally disapprove of any other
>>>    candidates.
>>>    - Voters may vote on the candidates in their or nearby districts, or
>>>    write in candidates from farther off.
>>>
>>> First, to simplify the ballots, the population is separated into a
>>> "district" for each seat, and "districts" are grouped into sets of 2 or 3
>>> "co-districts". The ballot for each district lists the incumbents and
>>> candidates from that district in a larger font, and the candidates from its
>>> co-districts below that in a smaller font. Write-ins may be used to vote for
>>> candidates from other districts not listed on the ballot, so the districts
>>> only matter for ballot simplicity (Voters do not want to have a ballot with
>>> many dozens of candidates on it, but write-ins allow full freedom for those
>>> voters who want it). Larger parties will usually run one candidate per
>>> district; smaller parties may just run one candidate per co-district set.
>>>
>>>    - Each vote is transformed into the pre-announced party preference
>>>    order and individual approvals/disapprovals of the candidate it chooses.
>>>    - A legislature is elected by a modified version of STV<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/STV>,
>>>    using the following steps:
>>>
>>>
>>>    1. The iteration number I is set to 1. (Higher iteration numbers mean
>>>    lower quotas. The process will be run from scratch with an increasing
>>>    iteration number until a full slate of candidates reaches the quota)
>>>    2. The quota Q is set to the Droop Quota<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Droop_Quota&action=edit&redlink=1>;
>>>    that is, to the rational number (V+1)/(S+I), where V is valid votes and S is
>>>    seats.
>>>    3. Delegated votes first count full-weight for their chosen
>>>    candidate. Once that candidate is elected or eliminated, a vote is divided
>>>    equally among all non-disapproved, non-eliminated members of the top party
>>>    remaining on that ballot with any such members.
>>>    4. Undelegated votes are divided equally among all approved,
>>>    non-eliminated candidates on that ballot.
>>>    5. Any candidates who reach the quota are immediately and
>>>    simultaneously elected, and their ballots are reweighted to eliminate a
>>>    Droop quota.
>>>    6. If there are no candidates who reach the quota, the party with the
>>>    fewest votes is identified, and the candidate from that party with the
>>>    fewest votes is eliminated. All votes for that candidate are reassigned as
>>>    outlined above.
>>>    7. If the above finishes without electing a full slate, the process
>>>    starts from scratch with a lower quota:
>>>       - All ballots are reweighted to 1
>>>       - All elected representatives return to being hopeful candidates
>>>       - The iteration number is increased by 1. This reduces the quota
>>>       Q, as if it were the Droop quota for a legislature one seat bigger.
>>>       - The counting process is rerun from scratch, starting with step
>>>       3.
>>>    8. Each district "drafts" one member of each elected party from the
>>>    elected slate. The draft proceeds as follows:
>>>       - First, each representative is drafted by their home district.
>>>       - From then on, the draft proceeds in descending order of votes.
>>>       That is, if more votes from district 1 go to candidate A than any other
>>>       eligible district:candidate pair, then A is drafted to that district.
>>>       Eligibility rules are as follows:
>>>    - All representatives from a party must be drafted N times before any
>>>       representative from that party may be drafted N+1 times.
>>>       - No district may draft two representatives from the same party.
>>>
>>> Your representative is the member of the party you voted for who is
>>> representing your district. If no member of the party you voted for was
>>> elected, then you may look at the public ballot of your chosen candidate to
>>> see which of your district's representatives is yours.
>>>  [edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=PAL_representation&action=edit&section=2>
>>> ]Optional party threshold
>>>
>>> Optionally, one additional rule can be added to modify step 5 above:
>>>
>>>    - No representative may be elected unless their party got at least T
>>>    votes, where T is some party threshold.
>>>
>>> This would encourage small parties to join into coalitions, and thus
>>> promote a less-fragmented legislature. There are various options for T. It
>>> could be as high as 5%, similar to the 5% threshold used in the German
>>> parliament. Or it could be as low as V/(S+I-1) (that is, V/S, if the process
>>> completes in just one iteration); this would actually allow independent
>>> candidates to be their own "party", but only if they have enough support to
>>> fully deserve one of the S seats.
>>>
>>> This rule complicates the system somewhat, so it is not recommended if
>>> the PAL representation is to be implemented by a voter referendum. If the
>>> system is being passed by a legislature, they may be more concerned about
>>> fragmentation, so they could use a relatively-high 5% threshold. And if the
>>> system is implemented by a constitutional convention, a V/(S+I-1) threshold
>>> is ideally fair.
>>>  [edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=PAL_representation&action=edit&section=3>
>>> ]Sample Ballot
>>>
>>> *District 5 ballot*
>>> *Vote for one candidate to delegate your vote, or otherwise vote for as
>>> many candidates as you approve:*
>>> ▢ *John Adams* (Yellow Party, district 5) (Prefers Yellow Party except
>>> for Zapatero)
>>> ▢ *Michelle Bachelet* (Silver Party, district 5) (Prefers Silver Party,
>>> then Purple Party)
>>> ▢ *Winston Churchill* (Purple Party, district 5) (Prefers Purple Party,
>>> then Silver Party except for Yarrow)
>>> ▢ Alfred Deakin (Yellow Party, district 6) (Prefers Yellow Party then
>>> Silver party except for Yarrow)
>>> ▢ John Edwards (Silver Party, district 6) (Prefers Silver Party then
>>> Purple party)
>>> ▢ *Vicente Fox* (Orange Party, district 6) (Prefers Orange Party then
>>> Silver party)
>>> ▢ Inder Gujral (Yellow Party, district 4) (Prefers Yellow Party)
>>> ▢ Stephen Harper (Silver Party, district 4) (Prefers Silver Party)
>>>
>>> ▢ ________________________(write-in)
>>> ▢ ________________________(write-in)
>>>
>>> *If you only vote for one candidate who does not win, your vote may help
>>> elect that candidate's preferences, unless you check the box below:*
>>> ▢ Do not delegate.
>>>
>>> *Note: When you vote for just one candidate, you are delegating your
>>> vote to him or her. This allows your vote to help elect a similar candidate
>>> if your favorite cannot win. Your vote will never go to a candidate who is
>>> not in your favorite's declared preferences listed above.*
>>>
>>> *If you vote for more than one candidate, or if you vote for a candidate
>>> with no declared preferences, your vote is not delegated. In that case, it
>>> does not matter whether you check the "do not delegate" box above.*
>>>  [edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=PAL_representation&action=edit&section=4>
>>> ]Example
>>> [image: Tennessee's four cities are spread throughout the state]<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/File:Tennessee_map_for_voting_example.svg>
>>>
>>> Imagine that Tennessee is having an election on where to locate 3 public
>>> universities. The population of Tennessee is concentrated around its four
>>> major cities, which are spread throughout the state. For this example,
>>> suppose that the entire electorate<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Electorate&action=edit&redlink=1> lives
>>> in these four cities, and that everyone wants to live as near as many
>>> universities as possible.
>>>
>>> The candidate sites for the university are:
>>>
>>>    - Memphis <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memphis> on Wikipedia, the
>>>    state's largest city, with 42% of the voters, but located far from the other
>>>    cities
>>>
>>>
>>>    - Site 1
>>>    - Site 2
>>>
>>>
>>>    - Nashville <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nashville> on Wikipedia,
>>>    with 26% of the voters, near the center of Tennessee
>>>    - The "Eastern Party", composed of:
>>>
>>>
>>>    - Knoxville <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knoxville> on Wikipedia,
>>>    with 17% of the voters
>>>    - Chattanooga <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chattanooga> on
>>>    Wikipedia, with 15% of the voters
>>>
>>> The preferences of the voters would be divided like this:
>>>  42% of voters
>>> (close to Memphis) 26% of voters
>>> (close to Nashville) 15% of voters
>>> (close to Chattanooga) 17% of voters
>>> (close to Knoxville)
>>>
>>>    1. *Memphis 1*
>>>    2. Rest of Memphis party:
>>>       - Memphis 2
>>>    3. Nashville
>>>    4. Eastern party
>>>       - Chattanooga
>>>       - (Knoxville not approved)
>>>
>>>
>>>    1. *Nashville*
>>>    2. Eastern party:
>>>       - Chattanooga
>>>       - Knoxville
>>>    3. Memphis party
>>>
>>>
>>>    1. *Chattanooga*
>>>    2. Rest of Eastern Party:
>>>       - Knoxville
>>>    3. Nashville
>>>    4. Memphis party
>>>
>>>
>>>    1. *Knoxville*
>>>    2. Rest of Eastern Party:
>>>       - Chattanooga
>>>    3. Nashville
>>>    4. Memphis party
>>>
>>>
>>> The quota is (100.0008%/(3+1))=25.0002% (The small fraction represents
>>> one extra virtual voter, to ensure that the quota cannot be met by four
>>> different sites). Since both Memphis (site 1) and Nashville are over the
>>> quota, both are elected first. Memphis votes are multiplied by 17/42 and
>>> transferred to Memphis site 2, and Nashville votes are multiplied by 1/26
>>> and then split evenly between Chatanooga and Knoxville. Totals are now:
>>>
>>>    - (Memphis 1: 25.0002% (elected))
>>>    - Memphis 2: ~17% (actually 16.9998%)
>>>    - (Nashville: 25.0002% (elected))
>>>    - Chatanooga: ~15.5% (actually, 15.4999%)
>>>    - Knoxville: ~17.5% (actually 17.4999%)
>>>
>>> The party with the fewest remaining votes is the Memphis party. Within
>>> that party, Memphis 2 is the site with the fewest votes (in fact, the only
>>> remaining site), so even though it has more votes than Chatanooga, Memphis 2
>>> is eliminated. The votes are pass over the already-elected Nashville to
>>> tranfer to the Eastern party. Within that party, Memphis disapproved
>>> Knoxville, so the full total is transferred to Chatanooga. Chatanooga now
>>> has ~32.5%, more than the 25% quota, so it is the third and final site.
>>>
>>> If Knoxville had not joined a party with Chatanooga, then Chatanooga
>>> would have been eliminated, and Knoxville would have been the final site.
>>> But Chatanooga could have responded by threatening to prefer a second
>>> Nashville site, or even Memphis 2, over Knoxville, if Knoxville would not
>>> cooperate in the Eastern party. In the end, Knoxville's strategy may or may
>>> not have worked. In general, such strategic gamesmanship would be less
>>> profitable and more dangerous in a real election, with more seats overall as
>>> well as a significant degree of polling uncertainty.
>>>  [edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=PAL_representation&action=edit&section=5>
>>> ]Advantages [edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=PAL_representation&action=edit&section=6>
>>> ]P
>>>
>>>    - Proportional
>>>
>>>
>>>    - Thus, a large majority of voters have real representation
>>>    - Each representative is elected with the same number of votes.
>>>
>>>
>>>    - Prudent; not a radical change from single-member districts
>>>
>>>
>>>    - No redistricting necessary
>>>    - If:
>>>
>>>
>>>    - all votes are for one of the two main-party candidates in the
>>>    voter's district,
>>>    - all candidates approve everyone from their party
>>>    - and the districts are divided fairly so that plurality would give a
>>>    proportional result
>>>
>>> ... then PAL representation (like Balinski's "Fair Representation") gives
>>> the same results as plurality. These assumptions will not generally be
>>> perfectly true, but they will generally be close to true, so PAL
>>> representation will give results that are recognizably similar to those of
>>> single-member districts. It is hoped that this would make it a more
>>> acceptable system to politicians who have won under single-winner rules.
>>> [edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=PAL_representation&action=edit&section=7>
>>> ]A
>>>
>>>    - Accountable
>>>
>>>
>>>    - Voters, not party bureaucrats, decide which members of a given
>>>    party get seated.
>>>    - Since the total votes needed for election is higher, the "margin of
>>>    victory" is reduced. There are no safe, gerrymandered seats where corrupt
>>>    representatives can hide.
>>>
>>> [edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=PAL_representation&action=edit&section=8>
>>> ]L
>>>
>>>    - Local
>>>
>>>
>>>    - Representatives know who is a constituent and voters know who is
>>>    their representative.
>>>    - Neighbors can organize to lobby their shared representatives.
>>>    - Fair attention for local issues.
>>>
>>> [edit<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=PAL_representation&action=edit&section=9>
>>> ]Justification
>>>
>>> PAL representation is inspired by Michel Balinski's "Fair Representation"
>>> and by SODA voting <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA_voting>. From
>>> the former, which is used for municipal elections in Belgium, it inherits
>>> the combination of geographical districts and proportionality. However,
>>> unlike Fair Representation, each candidate elected by PAL representation has
>>> received (directly or indirectly) the same number of votes. From SODA
>>> voting, PAL representation inherits the simple, spoilproof ballot format and
>>> the optional vote delegation.
>>>
>>> A modified version of STV is used as the proportional system for
>>> simplicity. Other proportional systems might also work (although a non-LNH
>>> system might put perverse incentives on candidates). The equal ranking, and
>>> resulting fractional division of votes, is necessary for three reasons.
>>> First, it allows for approval-style votes to be counted without complicating
>>> the ballot. Second, it allows candidates to exercise judgment independently
>>> from their party (disapproving of certain party members), but keeps the
>>> voter's judgment as primary. If candidates couldn't exercise judgment,
>>> parties would have to waste energy keeping out "crazy" candidates who
>>> affiliate only because of the transfer votes they might get. If candidates
>>> could fully-rank within the party, as would happen if the PR system were
>>> standard STV, there would be too many opportunities for logrolling, at a
>>> level of detail where voters wouldn't realistically keep track or hold
>>> candidates accountable. Third, equal-ranking allows us to claim that this
>>> system could, under reasonable circumstances, elect exactly the same
>>> representatives as a non-gerrymandered single-member-district system.
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>>
>>
>
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