[EM] Your MMPO example (I forgot thread-name)

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

You had written:
 
What do you make of this example under MMPO:
 
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
 
There is no CW. Standard MMPO returns a tie between B and C. If you remove A,
C is both the CW and MMPO winner. Do you think this can be accepted?
 
endquote

I'd replied:
 
Yes. Because, as I define it, MMPO chooses C.  I define MMPO as solving its own ties. I suggest that
MMPO's ties be solved by MMPO.
 
You wrote:
 
Yes, but what will you say when someone asks how it can possibly be that C is
a better winner than A? A has more first preferences, and neither has any lower
preferences. The only difference is that C voters listed a second preference.

endquote
 
And we should listen to that preference, and consider it when looking for the
most pair-opposed candidate (because of the strategy guarantees thereby made possible).
 
You wrote:
 
Is it better to elect a weak candidate, over a majority-defeated one? (I call C "weak"
because C apparently could never win the Approval version of this election.)
 
endquote
 
Most definitely. 1st choice strength, favoriteness, isn't as important to the goal
of getting rid of or minimizing defensive strategy dilemmas, the goal of offering
guarantees and protections regarding need for defensive strategy.
 
Pairwise opposition magnitude is more relevant to that goal.
 
You know, any good rank method is going to do terribly by some aesthetic criterion or
other. Any good rank method can do things that will look embarrassing, or even aesthetically undemocratic
sometimes. That's the nature of rank methods.
 
Either we accept that, or we only recommend Approval.
 
Look at what the method does, as it acts as intended--what it can guarantee to the voter, ...not at how unaesthetic it can look in some examples.
 
No rank method will always look good.
 
But no rank method that I know of can guarantee as much as MMPO can, in regards
to defensive strategy.