[EM] PR approval voting
Toby Pereira
tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk
Tue Oct 4 10:59:51 PDT 2011
My system isn't quota based and doesn't involve any reweighting or redistribution. It looks at every possible result (potentially problematic in itself) and works out a score for each one. Because there is no redistribution, a voter can lose out more than some other systems by voting too high for a candidate that is going to get elected anyway. But I would argue that it gives the best proportional results for honest voting, and could still potentially deliver good overall results unless some candidates' supporters are much better at adopting strategy than others. A bit like with single-winner range where you wouldn't expect one particular faction of voters to vote approval style and "ruin" the whole thing. (Not that it would necessarily ruin it)
From: Ted Stern <araucaria.araucana at gmail.com>
To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
Cc: Ted Stern <araucaria.araucana at gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, 3 October 2011, 20:49
Subject: Re: [EM] PR approval voting
On 03 Oct 2011 12:23:10 -0700, Toby Pereira wrote:
>
> I noticed on your page that you suspect that all multi-winner
> methods fail participation. I don't think that's the case. I would
> suggest that Forest Simmons's Proportional Approval Voting passes
> it. Also I think my versions of Proportional Approval Voting and
> Proportional Range Voting pass.
Since I wrote that, I have come to believe (but still haven't proved)
that Approval-based methods will generally pass participation and
IIAC.
A range based method will pass participation, at least in
single-winner, if it doesn't adjust ratings.
In many cases my version of Range Transferable Vote will elect winners
without having to raise ratings to meet quota. It only fails
participation in those cases where the quota is not met, which most
often happens on the last or penultimate seat.
Is your PRV method quota-based? If so, does it pass Droop
proportionality? If so, how do you deal with elevating preferences if
no candidate achieves a quota?
Ted
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