[EM] Declaration; are you ready to sign?

[Peter Zbornik]

Hi Richard and Jameson,

thanks for the great work on the Declaration.

Just one question:
Wouldn''t it be a good idea to add shortcuts to the relevant articles?

I.e. change the following text in the Declaration:

"The following Wikipedia articles provide detailed descriptions,
characteristics, and comparisons of our supported methods:

* Voting system
* Approval voting
* Condorcet method
* Majority Judgment
* Range voting"

to:

"The following Wikipedia articles provide detailed descriptions,
characteristics, and comparisons of our supported methods:

* Voting system <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system>
* Approval voting <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting>
* Condorcet method <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method>
* Majority Judgment <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_Judgment>
* Range voting <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Range_voting>".

Nota bene: The wikipedia entries for Condorcet method and Range voting have
some question marks in the beginning of the article concerning the quality
of the text (references to primary sources, article may need to be rewritten
entirely, additional citations needed).

I guess that there are no better articles (peer-reviewed etc) out there on
these two election methods?
Maybe someone could opt to improve the quality of the Wikipedia articles,
now when they are part of the Declaration?

Best regards
Peter Zborník


On Sat, Oct 1, 2011 at 7:10 PM, Richard Fobes <ElectionMethods at votefair.org>
wrote:
> Here is the latest version of our declaration.  If you are ready to sign
it,
> just supply your signature in the specified format, and Jameson Quinn or
> Richard Fobes will add your signature.
>
> We also welcome suggestions for wording refinements that will not affect
> those who have already signed.
>
> Google Docs URL:
>
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US
>
>
> Declaration of Election-Method Reform Advocates
>
> A Call to Move Beyond Plurality Voting
>
> Executive Summary
>
> This declaration, signed by election-method experts from around the world,
> publicly denounces the use of plurality voting – also called First Past
the
> Post – in governmental elections. Plurality voting suffers from major
flaws,
> including the risk of vote splitting. To avoid this risk, voters focus on
> only two dominant candidates and ignore other candidates they prefer.
>
> As replacements for plurality voting, this declaration recommends four
> significantly fairer election methods: Approval voting, most of the
> Condorcet methods, Majority Judgment, and Range voting. These methods all
> replace plurality voting's primitive single-mark ballot with improved
> ballots that collect more information.
>
> The signers take no agreed-upon position regarding the use of
instant-runoff
> voting (IRV), which is also known as the Alternative Vote. Opinions differ
> on whether this method’s disadvantages outweigh its advantages.
>
> As a consequence of adopting fairer election methods, this declaration's
> signers expect many direct benefits in government. They also expect
indirect
> economic and societal benefits, similar to the way the transition from
> monarchies to plurality-based democracies yielded dramatic long-term and
> widespread benefits. The signers of this declaration vary in political
> orientation, and believe the recommended election reforms will be fair to
> all, without bias that favors or opposes any particular political parties
or
> groups.
>
> The signers urge broader discussion of the flaws of plurality voting and
how
> the supported replacement methods eliminate those flaws. Private
> organizations can encourage this discussion by adopting one of the
supported
> voting methods.
>
> Most significantly the signers believe that any government that still uses
> plurality voting in any election should immediately replace that inferior
> method with one of the declaration-supported election methods.
>
>
> Annotated contents
>
> Introduction - It is time to change our voting system.
> Unfairness of plurality voting - Plurality voting is a bad method that is
> used far too often.
> Better ballots - With better information from voters, we can elect better
> winners.
> Fairer counting methods - Signers agree that any of these four voting
> methods will give more-democratic results: Approval voting, Condorcet
> voting, Majority Judgment, and Range voting.
> Additional considerations:
> Instant-runoff voting - We have differing opinions on this method, which
has
> both advantages and disadvantages.
> Proportional representation - Legislatures that represent all the voters
are
> a worthwhile goal, although proportional methods should not use closed
> lists.
> Using the fairer methods in organizations - Private organizations are a
> great place to start voting reform.
> Rounds of voting - Good voting methods can reduce the need for extra
rounds
> (primaries and runoffs), or give even-better results when combined with
such
> extra rounds.
> Counting process - Some of our supported methods are easy to implement,
and
> all will give fast, secure, and transparent results.
> Separate reforms - Reforming the voting system will facilitate and
reinforce
> other democratic reforms.
> Further resources - Here are sources for learning more about better
election
> methods.
> Benefits for all - Voting reform is truly a win/win solution that will
help
> all political groups.
> Taking action - We urge you to help promote better voting methods, both by
> spreading awareness and by doing what you can to implement them.
>
>
> (Full declaration)
>
> Introduction
>
> We, the undersigned election-method experts and advocates from around the
> world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in governmental
> elections. In this declaration we offer several ready-to-adopt replacement
> election methods that we agree will reliably produce much fairer results.
>
> We are confident that adopting any of our recommended methods will reduce
> the gap between what voters want and politicians do. Government will
become
> more accountable because voters will have more influence, and campaign
> contributions will have less influence. In other words, adopting any of
our
> supported election methods will increase the fairness of election results.
>
> We agree that there are no significant political or economic risks
> associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In fact,
we
> believe that the indirect benefits of better democracy will be
substantial.
> Just as plurality-based democracies tend to be more prosperous than
> monarchies, we expect that higher levels of democracy will lead to higher
> standards of living, reduced conflicts, and widespread increases in
> prosperity.
>
>
> Unfairness of plurality voting
>
> "Plurality voting” refers to the commonly used counting method in which
each
> voter marks only a single choice on the ballot, the number of marks for
each
> candidate are counted, and the candidate with the most marks is regarded
as
> the winner. In some nations this method is called "First Past The Post"
(and
> abbreviated FPTP or FPP).
>
> Although plurality voting produces fair results when there are only two
> candidates, the results are often dramatically unfair when it is used in
> elections with three or more candidates.
>
> "Vote splitting" is a key weakness of plurality voting. If there are two
> similar candidates, their supporters will split their votes between the
two.
> If the opposition concentrates all their votes on a single candidate, that
> candidate may win, even though either of the similar candidates would have
> won instead if there had been a one-on-one election. Vote splitting also
> happens in primary elections and nominating conventions.
>
> In many countries that use plurality voting, vote splitting in major
> elections is relatively rare because almost everyone votes for the nominee
> of one of the two dominant political parties, while ignoring other
> possibly-better candidates. This avoids vote splitting, but the resulting
> two-party monopoly causes many problems. Citizens become frustrated and
> fewer vote. Third-party and independent candidates are discouraged from
> running, and mostly ignored if they do. Any issues not promoted by one of
> the two main parties are scarcely debated publicly. And elected
politicians
> are less accountable to voters, more dependent on their biggest campaign
> contributors, and harder to remove if they become corrupt.
>
> In spite of its well-understood weaknesses, plurality voting is far too
> widely used in governmental elections throughout the world.
>
>
> Better ballots
>
> Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting –
> which in this declaration is called a "single-mark” ballot – is not
> appropriate in governmental elections. When there are more than two
> candidates, such ballots do not collect enough information to reliably
> identify the most popular candidate. This lack of information helps to
hide
> the unfairness of plurality voting.
>
> There are three kinds of ballots that collect enough information from
voters
> to clearly identify the most popular candidate. These are, in alphabetical
> order:
>
> * Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate the voter regards
> as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates who are not
> acceptable. Another variation allows the voter to mark “approved” or
> “disapproved” for each candidate.
>
> * Ranked ballot (or “1-2-3 ballot”), on which a voter indicates a first
> choice, and can indicate a second choice and additional choices at lower
> preference levels. For the election methods we endorse, the additional
> rankings are optional, and tied or skipped rankings are allowed.
>
> * Score ballot, on which a voter assigns a number or grade for each
> candidate. The most familiar versions of such voting are to rate something
> with 1 to 5 stars, or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, or to rate
> each choice at a named grade (such as "excellent", "good", "fair", "poor",
> or "reject"), but any range of numbers or grades can be used. Another
> variation allows the voter to leave some candidates unscored.
>
> Any of these three better ballot types will provide the information needed
> for fairer results — and for proving how unfair plurality voting has been.
>
>
> Fairer counting methods
>
> Unanimously we agree that the four counting methods listed below will
> produce significantly better results compared to plurality voting. For
each
> counting method we identify the main advantage claimed by that method’s
> proponents. (The methods are listed in alphabetical order to avoid any
> appearance of bias; the signers of this declaration have different
> preferences among them.)
>
> * Approval voting, which uses approval ballots and identifies the
candidate
> with the most approval marks as the winner.
>
> Advantage: It is the simplest election method to collect preferences
(either
> on ballots or with a show of hands), to count, and to explain. Its
> simplicity makes it easy to adopt and a good first step toward any of the
> other methods.
>
> * Most of the Condorcet methods, which use ranked ballots to elect a
> “Condorcet winner” who would defeat every other candidate in one-on-one
> comparisons. Occasionally there is no Condorcet winner, and different
> Condorcet methods use different rules to resolve such cases. When there is
> no Condorcet winner, the various methods often, but not always, agree on
the
> best winner. The methods include Condorcet-Kemeny, Condorcet-Minimax, and
> Condorcet-Schulze. (Condorcet is a French name pronounced "kon-dor-say.”)
>
> Advantage: Condorcet methods are the most likely to elect the candidate
who
> would win a runoff election. This means there is not likely to be a
majority
> of voters who agree that a different result would have been better.
>
> * Majority Judgment uses score ballots to collect the fullest preference
> information, then elects the candidate who gets the best score from half
or
> more of the voters (the greatest median score). If there is a tie for
first
> place, the method repeatedly removes one median score from each tied
> candidate until the tie is broken. This method is related to Bucklin
voting,
> which is a general class of methods that had been used for city elections
in
> both late 18th-century Switzerland and early 20th-century United States.
>
> Advantage: Majority Judgment reduces the incentives to exaggerate or
change
> your preferences, so it may be the best of these methods for finding out
how
> the voters feel about each candidate on an absolute scale.
>
> * Range voting (also known as score voting), which also uses score
ballots,
> and adds together the scores assigned to each candidate. The winner is the
> candidate who receives the highest total or average score.
>
> Advantage: Simulations have shown that Range voting leads to the greatest
> total “voter satisfaction” if all voters vote sincerely. If every voter
> exaggerates all candidate scores to the minimum or maximum, which is
usually
> the best strategy under this method, it gives the same results as Approval
> voting.
>
> This list of supported methods may expand in the future as we continue to
> analyze and test newly-developed methods. One new method that some of us
> currently favor is Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval (SODA) voting,
which
> combines Approval voting with vote delegation to simplify the voter’s
task.
>
> All of our supported methods are "single-winner" election methods, which
> means they are ideal for electing an executive such as a mayor or
governor.
> All of them have been used to elect officers such as presidents,
treasurers,
> and secretaries in non-governmental organizations, and the fairer results
> have been widely appreciated (except by some incumbents who were not
> reelected).
>
> Why do we not support a single "best" election method? Different
> election-method experts place different degrees of importance on the
> relative advantages and disadvantages of each method. For this reason, in
> the list of signatures some of us indicate which voting method we most
> strongly prefer. It bears repeating though, that despite our
disagreements,
> we would not hesitate to support any of these methods over plurality
voting.
> In signing this statement, we are uniting against plurality, not
“splitting
> the vote” by each supporting only our favorite method.
>
>
> Additional considerations
>
> These subsections provide clarifications for those who need more detail.
The
> Benefits for all and Taking action sections wrap up this declaration.
>
>
> Instant-runoff voting
>
> "Instant-runoff voting" – or "IRV" or "the Alternative Vote" – is a method
> that is used in some governmental elections throughout the world. IRV uses
a
> form of ranked ballot that disallows ties. The IRV winner is identified by
> repeatedly eliminating the candidate who is highest-ranked by the fewest
> voters compared to the other remaining candidates, until only one
candidate,
> the winner, remains.
>
> Many people appreciate IRV’s apparent similarity to runoff elections.
> Although IRV also has a possible advantage called “Later-No-Harm”, which
> means that adding further preferences after the election winner cannot
hurt
> the winner, evidence shows that Later-No-Harm is not a necessary
> characteristic for a good voting method. Most significantly, many of us
> agree that IRV can often give better results than plurality voting.
>
> However, IRV has significant disadvantages, including:
>
> * In some elections IRV has prematurely eliminated a candidate who would
> have beaten the actual winner in a runoff election. This disadvantage may
be
> why several cities, including Burlington, Vermont, repealed IRV and
returned
> to plurality voting.
>
> * To avoid premature eliminations, experienced IRV voters vote in a way
that
> produces two-party domination, causing problems that are similar to
> plurality voting. In Australia, where IRV has been used for more than a
> century, the House of Representatives has had only one third-party winner
in
> the last 600 elections.
>
> * IRV results must be calculated centrally, which makes it less secure.
>
> Our lack of formal support for IRV does not mean that all of us oppose it.
> After all, we and IRV advocates are fighting against the same enemy,
> plurality voting. Yet IRV’s disadvantages make it impossible for us to
> unanimously support it.
>
>
> Proportional representation
>
> To fill legislative seats, such as seats in a congress or parliament, many
> nations use "proportional representation". This term refers to methods
that
> match the proportion of legislators from political parties or certain
other
> groups with the proportion of voters who, on their ballot, associate
> themselves with each of those parties or groups.
>
> If a government uses the "closed-list" version of proportional
> representation, we unanimously support switching to either a
> "candidate-centric" or "open-list" version. We oppose closed-list methods
> because they disregard voter preferences for specific candidates, transfer
> power to party insiders who are not elected, and reduce transparency and
> accountability.
>
> It is not yet proven which is better: electing seats using a good
> single-winner system such as those we endorse, or using some form of
> proportional representation. We believe that increasing proportionality is
> important, so we encourage wider discussion and research about
proportional
> methods, but we do not offer any universal recommendations regarding
> proportional representation.
>
> We unanimously oppose the use of plurality voting in any aspect of filling
> legislative seats, so if plurality voting is used to elect legislators, it
> should be replaced. If a proportional method is not appropriate, any of
our
> supported single-winner methods should be used.
>
>
> Using the fairer methods in organizations
>
> Our recommended better voting methods can be used not just in public
> elections, but also to elect a private organization's officers, to elect
> corporate board members, to make group decisions, and to elect delegates
to
> political-party conventions. Such use will make these private elections
and
> decisions more fair, and help educate more people about better voting
> methods and their advantages.
>
>
> Multiple rounds of voting
>
> Many current elections use multiple rounds of voting. This includes both
> “primary elections” to narrow the choices before the main vote, and
> second-round “runoff elections” to ensure a majority if one is not
obtained
> in the main first round.
>
> Some of us believe that improved voting methods mean that only one round
of
> voting is needed. Others of us support multiple rounds. For instance, a
> runoff between the winners determined by the old versus the new election
> methods could ease voter concerns about reform and allow more in-depth
> debate between the top candidates. (Of course such runoffs would be
> unnecessary when the two methods pick the same winner.)
>
>
> Counting process
>
> The ease of switching to our supported methods varies according to the
> method. A switch is simplest with Approval voting, as this method is
> compatible with virtually all existing voting equipment and ballots, and
> both voting and counting can be done without computers. Switching to Range
> Voting or Majority Judgment would require redesigning paper ballots, yet
> existing ballot-scanning equipment may be able to count them. Also,
> typically, though not necessarily, these two methods would use computers
for
> both counting ballots and finding winners. Switching to a Condorcet method
> essentially requires the use of computers for both counting votes and
> calculating results, although hand-marked or computer-generated paper
> ballots are still recommended to keep a secure audit trail.
>
> All of our supported methods allow precinct-level counting and reporting,
> which enables fast, secure, and transparent access to the results. Voting
> authorities could easily release enough information to let citizens verify
> the results, without compromising the secrecy of individual ballots. Also,
> evidence suggests that at least three, and possibly all, of our four
> supported methods will result in fewer ballots needing to be rejected due
to
> a marking mistake. These advantages do not apply to some unsupported
methods
> such as instant-runoff voting.
>
>
> Separate reforms
>
> Most of us regard the adoption of our supported methods as merely one step
> toward improving democracy, and we view further reforms, such as improved
> campaign-finance reporting rules, as also desirable. Similarly, many of us
> believe that government bodies can make wiser decisions through reformed
> legislative procedures or by using decision-making aids such as
deliberative
> polling. The election-method reforms we advocate here will both facilitate
> and reinforce such other reforms.
>
>
> Further resources
>
> The following Wikipedia articles provide detailed descriptions,
> characteristics, and comparisons of our supported methods:
>
> * Voting system
> * Approval voting
> * Condorcet method
> * Majority Judgment
> * Range voting
>
> Some of us signing this statement edit these Wikipedia articles to keep
them
> accurate and unbiased. Also, many of us participate in the
> "Election-Methods" forum at www.electorama.com/em, and we would be happy
to
> answer your questions about any of these methods.
>
>
> Benefits for all
>
> Those of us signing this declaration have very different political views,
> yet here we have joined together to look beyond narrow, partisan
interests.
> We see no good reason to oppose election-method reform. In fact, we agree
> that better election methods can help all political groups: both
> conservatives and liberals, both business and labor, both incumbents and
> upstart campaigners, both centrists and extremists, both larger and
smaller
> parties. We believe that each of these groups can benefit in very concrete
> and specific ways, and many of us are available (as indicated above) to
> discuss how and why for each case.
>
> Politics is often viewed as a “zero-sum game” in which one side can gain
> only if another side loses. In contrast, we view election-method reform as
> taking the next step up the ladder of democracy. Just as plurality-based
> democracy has proven to be much better than dictatorships, higher levels
of
> democracy will help us reach even higher standards of living. We do not
> pretend to offer a utopia, where conflicts of interest disappear;
elections
> will always have winners and losers. Yet current plurality-based political
> systems are often so dysfunctional that they serve no one well. By helping
> ensure that the winners better represent the electorate, a healthier
system
> will benefit all groups.
>
>
> Taking action
>
> We address this statement to all citizens. Regardless of your political
> orientation, we urge you to help educate yourself, your friends, and your
> representatives about the advantages of better voting methods, and to
> organize with other like-minded citizens to reinforce your effectiveness.
To
> specific groups, we offer these recommendations:
>
> * If you are active in a political party that uses plurality voting, you
can
> increase your party’s chances of winning in the main election by using
> better voting methods to choose your party's candidates, delegates, and
> officers.
>
> * If you feel that “your” political party wants your vote and your money,
> but doesn’t care about your priorities, you can move towards having a real
> voice by focusing your support, including donations and volunteer time, on
> candidates who support election-method reform.
>
> * If you are involved in a small political party, you can urge the
adoption
> of one of the methods here as part of your party platform and an important
> strategy for growing your party.
>
> * If you are an independent voter, you can use your flexibility to favor
> candidates who help promote election reform.
>
> * If you are a member of an organization that elects officers using
> plurality voting, you can help your organization increase election
fairness,
> and run more smoothly, by requesting the use of a better election method
> when an election involves more than two candidates.
>
> * If your organization promotes government transparency or similar
reforms,
> you can help make politicians more receptive to your concerns by taking
> actions that promote better election methods in government, starting by
> using such methods internally.
>
> * Most importantly, if you are a policymaker, you can better represent
your
> constituents, reduce your need to constantly raise funds, and discourage
> negative campaigns, by introducing legislation to replace plurality voting
> with a better election method.
>
> The unfairness of plurality voting has been known for centuries, yet we
> still use it. Why? Plurality voting uses single-mark ballots that collect
> insufficient preference information, thus hiding its failures. And
computers
> only recently became available to easily study and implement better
ballots
> and better ways to count these ballots.
>
> We, the undersigned supporters of diverse election methods, united through
> recently developed digital-communication technologies, join our voices to
> denounce plurality voting and express our full support for superior
> replacements. We declare that it is time to begin putting the most
primitive
> voting method – plurality voting – where it belongs, namely in historical
> records as an early step in the progress toward higher levels of
democracy.
>
>
> Tentative “signatures”
>
> Format: name; contact; one line of academic/political credentials; and
which
> method(s) you support
>
> (Sorted by order of signing)
>
> * Jameson Quinn; firstname.lastname at gmail; served as statistical analyst
for
> two studies of Guatemalan voter rolls; supports Approval as a first step,
> and SODA or Majority Judgment as eventual goal.
> * Matt Welland;estiforta at gmail tod com; BSEE
> * Forest W. Simmons; PhD mathematician who has studied election methods
and
> participated in the Election-Methods list discussions for more than a
> decade; supports statement wholeheartedly
> * Richard Fobes; VoteFair.org; author of Ending The Hidden Unfairness In
> U.S. Elections, wrote major portions of this declaration; prefers VoteFair
> ranking, which is based on the Condorcet-Kemeny method
> * Craig Lee Chrisco; Walabio at MacOSX.Com; Layperson interested in voting
> methods, but without a degree in this field.
> * L. G. Ted Stern; <name without periods> at gmail dot com; Ph.D. Applied
> Math., occasional participant in Election-Methods list and ESF list since
> 2004; Supports Range, Approval, Bucklin/Majority Judgment, Condorcet, in
> that order, and Bucklin Transferable Vote for Proportional Representation.
> * Stéphane Rouillon; stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca; Engineer in Physics,
> M.Sc.A. Mechanical Engineering, Ph.D. Applied Mathematics, Member of the
> Expert Committee mandated by the Direction Générale des Elections du
Québec
> for studying the modalities of a mixed member compensatory system,
> Consultant for the "Soirée des Jutra" selection board, Expert-witness in
the
> Association pour la Revendication des Droits Démocratiques case, designer
of
> the System Preferential Proportional and Acirconscriptive; Single
> Transferable Vote fan.
> * Jack Rudd;jackkelshallrudd at aol;BSc in Mathematics;Approval, Range
> * Toby Pereira; firstname at firstnamelastname dot co dot uk; MA
Philosophy
> of Mind; No qualifications in this field but interested in voting systems
> generally
> * Andrew Jennings; elections at jenningsstory dot com; Ph.D. Mathematics
> (emphasis on Social Choice), and Treasurer, Center for Election Science
> * Warren D. Smith; warren.wds AT gmail.com, PhD applied math, co-founder
> rangevoting.org and president Center for Election Science
> * Sean Walker; crazy dot gold dot shield at gmail dot com; Undergrad in
> Mathematics; supports Approval as a first step, Range as a final goal
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
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