[EM] Remember Toby

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm 
> To: S Sosnick 
> Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com,
> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Remember Toby
> S Sosnick wrote:
> > On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, "I agree [with Juho 
> Laatu]. If minimax is twice as likely 
> > to be adopted, because it's simpler, and gives >95% of the 
> advantage vs. plurality of the 
> > theoretically-best Condorcet methods, then it *is* the best. 
> And besides, if we try to get
> > consensus on which is the absolutely best completion method, 
> then almost by
> > definition, we're going to end up arguing in circles (cycles?)."
> > 
> > I also agree. More noteworthy, however, is that Nicolaus 
> Tideman does, too. At page 242 of 
> > "Collective Decisions and Voting" (2006), he says, "If voters 
> and vote counters have only a slight 
> > tolerance for complexity, the maximin rule is the one they 
> would reasonably choose."
> 
> Wouldn't that title more likely go to Copeland? It's simple 
> (count 
> number of matches won x2 plus number of matches tied), is 
> already used 
> in sports, and (at least here) the sports application has a 
> tiebreaker, 
> too (basically, sum margins of defeats).
> 
> Copeland also always elects from the Smith set, and possibly 
> even the 
> uncovered set. It isn't cloneproof, but neither is Minmax. I 
> suppose 
> Minmax is more strategy-resistant, though.

It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type and ease of voting it than they are 
of the exact counting rules.   There are several Condorcet methods that are clone proof and monotonic 
without being too complicated.  I agree with Kevin that "elect the CW if there is one, else elect the 
candidate ranked (or ranked above last) on the greatest number of ballots" is plenty simple, and is much 
more satisfactory than MinMax or Copeland in other respects.

But, as I said, what we really need to concentrate on is simplicity in votinig, i.e. how do we make ballots 
that easy to use for "Hodge, fresh from the plough," as Lewis Carroll put it.

It has been averred many times on this list that in Australia, where partial rankings are considered 
spoiled ballots, the vast majority of voters fill out their ballots by copying "candidate cards" which are 
published  sample ballots recommended by the various candidates.

Asset voting makes this automatic for 100% of the voters.  That's probably going too far, so how do we 
get a compromise between Asset voting and Condorcet?