[EM] Hybrid/generalized ranked/approval ballots

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Peter,
 
Let me say first of all that proportional representation isn't my area of interest, so you
shouldn't take anything I say to apply also to a PR situation.
 
And although STV has a single-winner case, my thoughts on equal ranking don't apply
there either.

 


--- En date de : Ven 27.5.11, Peter Zbornik <pzbornik at gmail.com> a écrit :

[end quote]

I think you forgot Schulze as it is usually done: Weakest biggest loss.


 
With "weakest biggest loss", do you mean losing votes (http://m-schulze.webhop.net/, page 7)?
 
 
No I mean "winning votes" on that page. Is that what you meant by "biggest win"?
I can't really see how those could be the same thing.

 

Experimentally, in simulations: When you treat equal-ranking as split
votes, voters will have to compromise more often, instead of just
compressing the top ranks. This suggests weaker, non-frontrunner
candidates are more likely to be best advised to drop out of the race,
because their presence is more likely to harm the voters that support
them.

 
Could you please send me a link to these simulations?
 
 
There is no complete set of simulations currently/yet. If you want to get a sense of
what I was doing, you can go to the archives:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/
and read my March 2011 posts in particular. My simulations involve voters who do not
initially know anything about the method except the valid ballot types, but try to 
determine their ideal vote in a given situation via repeated and hypothetical polling.
 
I have explained (probably five years ago) why we should expect margins to have more
favorite betrayal incentive than WV though. Suppose that you want to vote A>B, but
so doing causes C to win instead of B, because A defeats B pairwise. In WV both
reversing the order to be B>A or compressing the top to be A=B have the same effect
in reducing the magnitude of B's loss to A. But in margins reversal is twice as effective
as compression.
 
Kevin Venzke
 
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