[EM] a question about apportionment

[Juho Laatu]

Luckily Condorcet can use both ranking and rating style ballots (because rankings can always be derived from the more complex rating information). If one uses ratings, voting in Condorcet is easier than in Range in the sense that the voter need not care what numeric scale one uses. The first guess is good enough. Ratings A=1 B=2 C=3, A=1 B=2 C=9 and A=1 B=6 C=9 are equal in Condorcet.

It is difficult to say how much a typical voter would spend time and effort to consider strategic aspects when voting. In Range the scale that one uses is important. Ballots A=1 B=2 C=9 and A=1 B=9 C=9 have a very different strategic impact. In Condorcet a typical voter need not care about strategies while in Range a typical voter should consider what the optimal strategy is (unless the Range voter wants to cast a "sincere" vote without any wish to cast a strong strategic vote, and unless strategies would become usable in some Condorcet election).

Sincere voting in Range may thus be easy. Sincere ratings in Condorcet should be as easy or easier. In competitive Range elections every voter should consider what strategy tho choose (and how to rig the vote accordingly) while in Condorcet one may assume that regular voters need not worry about strategies.

Juho



On 9.5.2011, at 6.53, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> How hard it is to vote in each system is an empirical, not a theoretical system. The evidence is pretty clear that it is easier for most people to rate candidates on an absolute scale - whether numeric or verbal - rather than ranking them relative to each other. That is true despite the fact that it is illogical, that in some sense it should be easier to give a ranked vote which contains less information. But the fact remains: people can usually vote faster, with less ballot spoilage, and with less self-reported difficulty, under Range as compared to Condorcet.
> 
> 2011/5/8 Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
> One of his thoughts caught my eye.
> 
> On May 8, 2011, at 1:32 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
> 
>        With Condorcet, one must rate many candidates and then one must resolve cycles.  I prefer scorevoting.
> 
> We do not usually say "rate" with Condorcet but, thinking:  Two thoughts fit together for Score.
> We optimize the ratings but, before we can really do that, we need to order the candidates from best to worst.
> 
> In Condorcet we also need to order the candidates - so it makes sense to separate this shared task before comparing the differences in the systems.  So now, comparing the systems:
> 
> For either, order the candidates from best, that this voter hopes wins, to the collection of worst that this voter equally dislikes and wants to help none of.
> 
> For Score distribute ratings equally, with equal ratings ok for equal liking - trivial effort.  Then optimize ratings - perhaps for each trio, B/S/W, adjust S up to help S beat W, or down to help B beat S - THIS is LABORIOUS.
> 
> For Condorcet simply rank as sorted, with equal rankings ok, and leaving worst unranked - trivial effort.  DONE, for the voter is not concerned with cycles, a task for the method when there are three or more nearly tied candidates that form a cycle.
> 
> 
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