[EM] Approval fraud prevention (was Re: A conversation with an English woman about IRV)

[Jameson Quinn]

Unfortunately, there is no task that you can manually ask the voters to do,
which won't lead to unacceptably high levels of spoiled ballots. My ballot
doesn't count because I didn't vote against Wingnut Moonbat? Or because I
didn't count up my approvals correctly? Once I failed to win a competition
because I incorrectly counted and self-reported my score. Since it was a
math competition, perhaps that was just. But voting is not a math
competition; spoiled votes should be avoided.

So, you need some ballot integrity process which is separate from the voting
system used. It could be automatic photos of the ballot; it could be
machine-marked-voter-verified-paper-ballots; it could be some kind of
transparent sticker or other surface treatment; it could be multiple custody
throughout the ballot's lifetime (never let anyone alone with them); or many
other things.

Note that such a system is just as necessary for plurality, or approval with
a requirement to vote against, or whatever. I can just as easily commit
fraud by spoiling my opponents' votes as by adding votes for me.

Jameson

2011/5/4 Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>

> Agreed that the warning about "fraudprone" is valid.  Rather than the
> labor-intensive change I see below, I would simply require the voter to
> indicate quantity of approvals.
>
> Dave Ketchum
>
>
> On May 4, 2011, at 3:14 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
>
>         2011-05-04T05:48:15Z, “Matt Welland” <Matt at Kiatoa.Com>:
>>
>>         I think it is within reach for us to change this bad situation but
>>> we need the experts (you) to accept that the world isn't ready for the
>>> perfect solution and drive hard for the most achievable and pragmatic
>>> solution. Please consider getting behind Approval voting and to stop
>>> confusing the politicians and public with complicated ideas. Repeat this
>>> everywhere: Approval good, plurality bad, IRV worse.
>>>
>>
>>        I know that we must focus like a laser.  I point out that plurality
>> and IRV are bad.  I advocate approval with a twist:
>>
>>        The ballot like thus, is fraudprone:
>>
>>                [ ]      Candidate       A
>>                [ ]      Candidate       B
>>                [ ]      Candidate       C
>>                [ ]      Candidate       D
>>                [ ]      Candidate       E
>>                [ ]      Candidate       F
>>                [ ]      Candidate       G
>>                [ ]      Candidate       H
>>                [ ]      Candidate       I
>>                [ ]      Candidate       J
>>                [ ]      Candidate       K
>>                [ ]      Candidate       L
>>                [ ]      Candidate       M
>>                [ ]      Candidate       N
>>                [ ]      Candidate       O
>>                [ ]      Candidate       P
>>                [ ]      Candidate       Q
>>                [ ]      Candidate       R
>>                [ ]      Candidate       S
>>                [ ]      Candidate       T
>>                [ ]      Candidate       U
>>                [ ]      Candidate       V
>>                [ ]      Candidate       W
>>                [ ]      Candidate       X
>>                [ ]      Candidate       Y
>>                [ ]      Candidate       Z
>>
>>
>>        Because a supporter of O can approval O after the ballots are cast
>> on every ballot not already approving O.  This is better:
>>
>>        Instructions
>>
>>        One must either approve [+] or reject [-] every candidate or the
>> ballot is considered spoiled.
>>
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       A
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       B
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       C
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       D
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       E
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       F
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       G
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       H
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       I
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       J
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       K
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       L
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       M
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       N
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       O
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       P
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       Q
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       R
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       S
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       T
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       U
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       V
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       W
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       X
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       Y
>>        [+]      [-]     Candidate       Z
>>
>>        Now the ballots are resistant to manipulation after voting.  This
>> format is human/machine-readable.
>> ----
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>> info
>>
>
>
>
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