[EM] round robin tournaments RBJ
Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Thu Jun 30 19:38:10 PDT 2011
Hi,
--- En date de : Mer 29.6.11, Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :
> It seems that quite typically
> different viewpoints on margins and winning votes are linked
> to the question of implicit approval. ...
> Majorities are also one point of interest. ...
In my view it is not realistic to think we can get away from these things
being important in public elections.
> One reason why I don't like implicit approvals very much is
> that they tend to bring some truncation incentive with them.
...
> One can collect quite well sincere rankings
> (trying to be optimistic here)
In my view you don't have any particularly outstanding alternatives,
if you don't share Juho's optimism.
> Do all the additional
> tricks improve the very basic minmax with margins or do they
> just make the method more complex (maybe better in some
> places, maybe worse in others) and more like a hack instead
> of an agreed function that measures the quality of the
> candidates.
I find it bizarre that margins would be taken as a starting point from
which one is thought to be deviating. As far as I can tell, very few
other methods (or even defeat strength proposals) seem to have a similar
mentality to margins.
If you want to "deduce" WV I can think of two ways.
1. Start with the "participation in the contest" criterion. Notice that
it's non-monotonic to count losers towards the strength of the contest.
So, drop them out. Done.
2. Start with the "minimize voters who will wish they had done something
different" (i.e. compromise) criterion. Notice that using this criterion
gives winning side voters incentive to lie in order to create the
appearance that they would regret a certain outcome. Fix this by already
counting all the winning side voters as potentially remorseful.
Kevin Venzke
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list