[EM] C//A

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

You have just given one of the many equivalent formulations of DMC, which always elects the lowest 
approval candidate that beats all of the more approved candidates pairwise.

----- Original Message -----
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm 
Date: Monday, June 13, 2011 7:51 am
Subject: Re: [EM] C//A
To: fsimmons at pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com

> fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:
> 
> > Can anybody do a simpler description of any other Clone 
> Independent Condorcet method?
> 
> That's quite good.
> 
> Would a method of the sort "While there is no uneliminated CW, 
> eliminate 
> the Approval loser/s" be cloneproof? How about "while there is 
> no 
> uneliminated CW, eliminate the Range loser/s"?
> 
>