[EM] Defensive strategy for Condorcet methods

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Kevin Venzke wrote:

> Is Condorcet//FPP a bad method?

I agree with Jameson Quinn, the gap is too far and so it could be quite 
tempting to compromise as in FPTP (and failing that, to engineer a cycle 
if your candidate has great first place support).

Smith,FPP... perhaps better, but there's still a gap between the 
Condorcet and the FPP part.

If you want something that deters burial strategy, how about what I 
called FPC? Each candidate's penalty is equal to the number of 
first-place votes for those who beat him pairwise. Lowest penalty wins.
Burying a candidate may help in engineering a cycle, but it can't stack 
more first-place votes against him. Unfortunately, it's not monotone.

Finding the most strategy-resistant monotone Condorcet method is an 
interesting problem. If you permit approval cutoffs, UncAAO and C//A are 
probably quite good, but if not... what, I wonder? Perhaps some Ranked 
Pairs variant where winning contests are sorted ahead of losing 
contests, and then sorted further by FPP score of the first person in 
the ordering (e.g. A for A>B and B for B>A)? Or some Maxtree 
generalization. Who knows?