[EM] Defensive strategy for Condorcet methods DK
Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sat Jun 11 12:54:35 PDT 2011
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit :
> Seems that some are so lacking in
> understanding Condorcet that they fear it. So, a
> couple basics:
> . The voter can rank such as A=B=C, saying exactly
> equal approval of these three over all other
> candidates. This has the same effect as it would have
> in true Approval.
> . The voter can rank such as A>B>C, approving
> these three over all other candidates. Here the
> ranking reads as A>B, A>C, and B>C for detailed
> liking among those ranked..
I know what the votes are supposed to mean. This is a strategy
discussion.
Kevin Venzke
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