[EM] Defensive strategy for Condorcet methods DK

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sat Jun 11 12:54:35 PDT 2011


Hi Dave,

--- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit :
> Seems that some are so lacking in
> understanding Condorcet that they fear it.  So, a
> couple basics:
> .  The voter can rank such as A=B=C, saying exactly
> equal approval of these three over all other
> candidates.  This has the same effect as it would have
> in true Approval.
> .  The voter can rank such as A>B>C, approving
> these three over all other candidates.  Here the
> ranking reads as A>B, A>C, and B>C for detailed
> liking among those ranked..

I know what the votes are supposed to mean. This is a strategy 
discussion.

Kevin Venzke




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