[EM] Defensive strategy for Condorcet methods

[Jameson Quinn]

It's easy to minimize the problems with one's preferred systems, and focus
on the problems with other systems you see as "competing" for mindshare.
It's not even dishonest: the truth is that, compared to the giant issues
with plurality, any good system has problems that are minor, but that on the
other hand such minor problems would still be a hurdle in convincing voters
to make a switch.

But I don't think it's getting us much of anywhere to argue this back and
forth.

Let's imagine these minimizing-the-issues points were all granted, on all
sides. Say Condorcet had negligible strategy, Range strategy were always
unbiased, and SODA had no smoky rooms. (I think that all three propositions
are close enough to true to use as an approximation.) I think that it's
undeniable then that SODA would have the simplest balloting and Range the
best results.

So I, personally, don't see the attraction of Condorcet when compared to
other proposals. But... I'd rather find a way to agree than fight about it.
In my other recent message, I suggested that we put forward SODA and one
simple Condorcet method as the practical proposals in some statement which
people here could sign on to.

Jameson

2011/6/8 Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk>

> There has been quite a lot of discussion around the strategic
> vulnerabilities of Condorcet methods on this list recently. In general I
> think Condorcet methods are one of the least vulnerable to strategies, and
> in most typical elections their vanilla versions are simply good enough. In
> the case that people would start voting strategically there is one
> interesting defensive strategy that has not been discussed very much. The
> defensive strategy is to not tell your sincere opinions in the polls. Most
> Condorcet strategies are based on quite accurate understanding on how others
> are going to vote. If I expect someone to play foul play, I might just
> refuse to give the required information to them, and recommend others to do
> the same. (Also giving planned false information to mislead the strategists
> is possible, but more difficult.)
>
> This approach does not work about irrational voters that will bury anyway,
> just in case that might help. But the point is that in Condorcet elections
> the best strategy, in the absence of good information on the preferences, is
> to vote sincerely. In real life this strategy could be mentioned as a
> possibility in the case that strategic voting becomes threatening. The
> outcome hopefully is such that all parties, experts and media would
> recommend voters to vote sincerely and not try strategies. That would be
> better to all than having to live without the interesting polls. What do you
> think? Is this a way to drive away possible evil spirits and strategy
> promoting parties, experts and media?
>
> Juho
>
>
>
>
>
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