[EM] SODA in a de-facto two-party system

[Jameson Quinn]

I continue to be encouraged by the potential of SODA as a practical voting
reform proposal. One of its advantages that I see is that, more than any
other system I can think of, it is compatible with both a two-party and a
multiparty system.

While many of us are convinced that, in the long run, a multiparty system is
healthier, we should not neglect the importance of a voting system being
compatible with two parties. Current politicians, winners under a two-party
system, are in many cases the gatekeepers of reform. Yes, that's largely a
case of the fox guarding the henhouse, but it's also a fact of life.

So, why is SODA compatible with two parties? Here's the kind of pitch you
could make to a Republican or Democrat. Although I'd definitely include less
disingenuous trash talk about other good systems or about third parties or
independents, I'm including it here to show the kind of arguments that you
could make:

"SODA encourages most voters to vote for a single candidate, just as they do
today. So an average joe, who wants to put as little thought as possible
into his ballot, will still be voting for one of the major parties. With the
large majority of ballots in the same two-party split as today, the minor
parties will have essentially no choice but to delegate their vote to one of
the majors, or relegate themselves to irrelevance. So all this will do is
remove that (Libertarian/Green) thorn from your side.

"Any other system is more of a danger to you. You ever heard of a Condorcet
Winner? No? Well, most systems try to elect a Condorcet Winner, and lemme
tell you something: H. Ross Perot, that's what a Condorcet winner is.
Somebody who comes up in the center, in between the two parties, and it
doesn't matter how incompetent or unexperienced he is, because the
Democratic voters prefer him to a Republican, and the Republican voters
prefer him to a Democrat, so it doesn't matter, he could be two wheels short
of a tricycle, there's still no way to beat him. Well, look at how SODA
handles that. The Democrat and the Republican, they don't announce a
preference order, so it's pointless for him to ask them to delegate their
votes to him - they can't. So if the Perot guy wants to be in the game and
delegate to someone - whoever he pre-announced before the election, if
anybody - he can do that; if he wants to be out of the game, he doesn't
announce a delegation order up front, so he either wins or loses on his own.
In the first case, he's just a minor candidate, like a Green or a
Libertarian, and you don't have to worry about him any more than about them.
In the second case, he's irrelevant, at worst a spoiler, just as under
plurality. So either way, you're at least as well-off as you are today."

OK, maybe I went a little overboard. So here's the pitch I'd make to a
third-party supporter to balance it out.

"What do you want, in the end? People like you are in a minority, and I'm
sure you realize that you won't take over the world overnight. So you want a
fair hearing, you want a seat at the table. Most voting systems are just
selling you dreams. One day, they say, you're going to convince a majority
to join your team, and on that glorious day your team's gonna be in charge.
How well has that worked for the Republicans and the Democrats? How much
important change do you see when the pendulum swings back between the two of
them? Not enough. The truth is, by the time you sway a majority, your big
ideas are going to be watered down.

"But there's another option. You can keep having big ideas, and just have a
system that doesn't shut you out of the room. There are a lot, a lot of
people who aren't fully satisfied with 'their' party, who are looking for
another option. Take off their two-party shackles, let them safely vote for
someone else, and they'll jump at the chance. And there you will be, with
10, 15, 25% of the vote. No, that won't be enough to win, but it will darn
well be enough to get some respect, to get your ideas a fair hearing. And if
the major party supposedly on 'your' side doesn't listen, you will have the
power to take those votes and go home. You know and I know that major party
politicians, they call themselves leaders, but what they really are is
cowards. When you're sitting on a double-digit pile of votes, they will
listen to you, trust me."

....

Both of those pitches are feeding on the sicknesses inherent in a two-party
duopoly. But that doesn't mean that SODA would feed those sicknesses or make
them worse; I'm just using those sicknesses to make an argument that I think
is fully justified. Remember, SODA is fully compatible with a multiparty
world; in fact, as I've argued, it is in an important sense more Condorcet
compliant than a Condorcet system.

....

Having considered these issues, there are two refinements I'd make to SODA:

   - If, after voting, one candidate has an absolute majority OR is the only
   possible winner, they win immediately.

Sure, I can think an argument for why SODA should elect someone who's not
the initial majority winner. But I don't relish the thought of having to
make that argument, either with a politician or with a regular voter. And in
reality, a majority winner is the correct winner in more than 95% of the
cases, so let's just save the time and admit that immediately.


   - If, after voting, one candidate has fewer than 5% of the votes, their
   votes are automatically delegated to the first candidate on their preference
   list who has more than 5% (if any). The receiving candidate may delegate
   them in turn, only if the result thereby obtained or encouraged is
   consistent with the preference order of the original candidate. (That means
   that if minor A's order is B,C,D,E,F, and D is the first one of those with
   more than 5%, and D's order is C,F,X, E,..., then D may delegate these votes
   to C, or to C and F if F is already leading E by a greater margin than the
   number of votes in question, or to C, F, and E if D is delegating their own
   votes to X as well.)

This appears to be a bigger compromise of principle than the above. But
consider the "kingmaker" case: in a basically 50/50 split, some tiny party
has the balance of votes, and manages to extract concessions far bigger than
their base of support justifies, just in order to [not] delegate those
votes. I think that's unjust, and this rule would prevent it.

I think that 5% is a good cutoff here; that's tens of millions of voters,
and enough to deserve a voice. It shouldn't be too high, because this rule
is effectively taking power away from voters; that's only justified if the
faction is so small that the power is not legitimate, and so it's better to
err a bit on the small side if anything. But under 5% - that is, under 10%
of the winning coalition - doesn't deserve kingmaker power.

JQ
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