[EM] C//A

[Jameson Quinn]

I understand that you have a rational reason for not wanting something like
()3 ()2 ()1 - because
(x)3 ()2 (x)1 is ambiguous. But I don't agree. I think most people have an
easier time understanding if you tell them that
(x)3 ()2 (x)1 means 3, than understanding that
(x)2 (x)1 means 3.

Just an opinion,
JQ

2011/6/13 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

>
> Some folks have opined that the ballot line
> [candidate name]  (4)  (2)  (1)
> Is too complicated.
>
> How about just
> [name]  (2)  (1)
> with the understanding that the score that you assign to the name is the
> sum of the digits of the bubbles
> that you darken, namely zero (for the empty sum), one, two, or two plus
> one.
>
> The only arithmetic you need to know is that  2+1 is greater than 2, which
> is greater than one, which is
> greater than nothing.
>
> If that is too complicated, then we are left with the only thing simpler,
> namely Plurality ballots, which
> means that the possible methods are Plurality, Asset, Approval, and SODA.
>
> In any case, I think that the 2+1 style ballots are adequate for Condorcet
> methods, because even when
> your favorite is not in the top three cycle, you can still rate these four
> candidates distinctly.
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