[EM] Remember Toby

[Dave Ketchum]

Been a busy day on this thread.  I will try for Condorcet, to sell  
that it can be good and usable by voters without requiring much new  
understanding by them.

Ranking:
      IRV ranking, learned by many, is a start, with equal ranking a  
trivial addition.
      Approval voting permissible and usable as valid Condorcet by  
using a single rank number.

How many rank numbers?  Three, as in IRV, is  probable reasonable  
minimum.  More needs thought, but not necessarily many - usability of  
equal ranks minimizes true need for more.

Write-ins - need being doable and countable with reasonable effort.

Majority:  Needed by plurality.  Minimum truly needed can be different  
for other methods.

Counting:  I promote an N*N matrix with a row and column for each  
candidate, and an N array with an element for each candidate.  If a  
write-in is in one array/matrix and not in another, a merged array/ 
matrix of the precincts will need to include such.
      When reading a ballot each ranked candidate gets counted in the  
array.  For each pair of ranked candidates this will later be counted  
in the matrix as if both won so, right now, adjust in the matrix for  
the losing candidate - and for equal ranks if that is needed.
      In the final array/matrix, after reading all ballots, add each  
array element to each element in its row in the N*N matrix.
      This both reduces labor while reading ballots and provides for  
proper counting of write-ins.

Cycles:  Cycle members have to approach equality for the cycle to  
possibly complete, and each cycle member would be CW in absence of  
other cycle members.  Thus it seems reasonable to look only among  
members to decide who should act as CW.

Hybrids such as Approval/Asset?  I choke because their combined  
methods end up making complications for voters.

Dave Ketchum

On Jun 3, 2011, at 7:01 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> I thought of a simpler way to explain my "safety" fix. The full  
> system description follows, with my new phrasing in bold.
>
> N days before the election, all candidates (including declared write- 
> in candidates) rank order all other candidates (including declared  
> write-in candidates). These orderings are announced. In the  
> election, all voters submit an approval ballot, with two spaces for  
> write-ins. Total approvals and number of bullet votes are counted  
> for each candidate and announced. (Bullet votes are votes for only  
> one candidate, including all valid or invalid write-in votes.) Then  
> each candidate may grant the number of bullet votes they received to  
> N other candidates from the top of their preference list, where N  
> can be any number including 0. All candidates decide what number N  
> to use simultaneously, and then those decisions are announced  
> publicly. Take the two candidates with the highest approvals.  
> Recount those two as if they hadn't approved each other (that is,  
> without adding any bullet votes from one to the other). The winner  
> is the candidate of those two with the highest approval in this  
> final count.
>
> The purpose of removing the mutual votes from the top two before  
> deciding the pairwise winner of these two is, as I explained before,  
> to make it so that one candidate will never lose because they  
> approved another one. This frees candidates to be honest in their  
> approvals.
>
> I believe that this system, as described, is pareto-dominant over  
> plurality, asset, and approval.
>
> It is also very Condorcet-compliant. That is, assuming that X% of  
> all candidates' voters agree with their candidate's preference  
> order, and that the other (100-X)% have preferences which cancel  
> each other out (random noise); that this X is the same for all  
> candidates; that all voters who do not agree with their candidate do  
> not bullet-vote (voting for a random number of extra candidates),  
> and all voters who do agree with their candidate do bullet vote; and  
> that there is a true pairwise champion; then the pairwise champion  
> will win in a (unique) strong Nash equilibrium. This is a very solid  
> result, which relies on the perfect information of the candidates  
> when choosing how to "delegate" their approvals; it is NOT true of  
> systems such as Approval or even DYN (without the preference- 
> ordering and top-two-pairwise-recount aspects). It is not even true  
> of any Condorcet system I know of (because of strategy)! So this  
> system (and some obvious variants) is in fact the most Condorcet- 
> compliant system I know of.
>
> Since it is also relatively simple to understand - not as simple as  
> approval, but not too far behind - I think it makes an excellent  
> candidate for a practical proposal.
>
> Jameson Quinn
>
> I'd add my "safety" fix to the near-clone problem, if someone can  
> think of an easy way to describe and motivate it. Basically, it  
> looks at any candidate who mutually approve with the winner, and  
> sees if they would beat the winner (pairwise) with those mutual  
> approvals turned off. This helps when, for instance (honest  
> preferences):
>
> 35: X1>X2
> 25: X2>X1
> 21: Y>>X2
> 19: Y>>X1
>
> If X1 and X2 approve each other, the right thing happens (X1 wins),  
> no matter what Y voters do. If they do not, this fix does not  
> attempt to read anyone's minds (or to ask people again in a runoff).
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20110603/9135fee7/attachment.htm>