[EM] Remember Toby

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/6/3 Kathy Dopp <kathy.dopp at gmail.com>

> Forest,
>
> While I love the complement of "great idea", I still am not 100% sure
> if the method is well-defined. I.e. under what condition do all the
> Asset voters (the candidates) get to cast their 2nd choice votes for
> the voters?  To be fair, wouldn't all candidates who received any
> bullet votes have to be allowed to cast 2nd choice votes. But then,
> wouldn't that be like voting against themselves?  Or doesn't Asset
> voting have similar problems to IRV if only the losing candidates get
> to reapportion their votes -- i.e. tending to elect extremist
> candidates on the right or left and eliminating centrist majority
> favorites because the 2nd choices of some voters (that they've
> allocated to their 1st choice candidate) would be hidden during the
> counting process?
>

It's important to be concrete when you think about this. Candidates would
not be faced with an abstract choice of whether to support each other, in a
vacuum. They would know the full first-round results. If you think about
specific scenarios, you'll quickly see that a candidate will almost always
know whether they can win - and shouldn't approve others - or whether they
have no chance. That won't be simply a matter of how many votes they have,
but also looking at the preference orders of the other candidates; so
"center squeeze" is not a problem.

To put this in the abstract terms that a lot of people here like: insofar as
people bullet voted, a Condorcet winner would be knowable, and then it would
be a strong Nash equilibrium for that person to win. And insofar as people
didn't bullet vote, then the approval winner would be clear, so candidate
strategy wouldn't matter.

As for names, I'd prefer ODA (optional delegated approval) over AA, though
I'll accept whatever the consensus is.

Jameson
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20110603/5fdfb1e6/attachment.htm>