[EM] Remember Toby

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/6/3 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

> Dear Kathy,
>
> Great idea!  Why didn't I think of that?  As you indicated, it could be
> done with an ordinary Plurality
> ballot, and would amount to a simplified version of DYN:
>
> If a voter "bullet" votes, then the ballot is interpreted as submission of
> a replicate of the Approval ballot
> that the marked candidate ends up submitting. Otherwise it is interpreted
> as an ordinary Approval ballot.
> The candidate with the most approval wins.
>
> To rule out the smoke-filled-room scenario, candidates' Approval ballots
> must be consistent with their
> rankings of the candidates, which they are required to publish at least a
> three (?) days before the voting
> takes place.
>
> This method is indeed uniformly better than Plurality, Asset, and Approval!
>

Well... it's only uniformly better than Approval if you allow
non-tranferable bullet-voting. So you'd need to include an option to opt-out
of the delegation process. That's simple, though - for instance, writing in
"Mickey Mouse" would do the trick.


>
> What should we call it?
>
> Can anybody think of a better deterministic voting method for a single
> winner public proposal?
>
>
This is a great proposal.

I'd add my "safety" fix to the near-clone problem, *if* someone can think of
an easy way to describe and motivate it. Basically, it looks at any
candidate who mutually approve with the winner, and sees if they would beat
the winner (pairwise) with those mutual approvals turned off. This helps
when, for instance (honest preferences):

35: X1>X2
25: X2>X1
21: Y>>X2
19: Y>>X1

If X1 and X2 approve each other, the right thing happens (X1 wins), no
matter what Y voters do. If they do not, this fix does not attempt to read
anyone's minds (or to ask people again in a runoff).



> Forest
>
> >Kathy Dopp kathy.dopp at gmail.com responded to
>
> >> Date: Thu, 02 Jun 2011 19:14:12 +0000 (GMT)
> >> From: fsimmons at pcc.edu
> > >To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>
> > I>s DYN too complicated?  If so, we are stuck with ordinary Approval or
> ordinary Asset Voting.  They
> are
> > >the only choices simpler than DYN that dominate Plurality.
>
> >Great analysis. I like the "uniformly better" concept. I agree with
> everything you said - very logical.
>
> >Question: Wouldn't there be a third option that is uniformly better
> than plurality - an Approval/Asset hybrid?  I.e. allow voters to rank
> only one candidate - then if that candidate loses, those voters who
> rank only one candidate transfer the right to their losing candidate
> to cast their vote for another candidate. Or if voters choose more
> than one candidate, their own extra approval votes are counted.
>
> >Just a thought that might alleviate the problem that some Judges have
> found with some electoral methods on the basis of voters having
> unequal amount of votes if voters may choose either two candidates or
> one candidate and their candidate gets to cast their other vote, but I
> haven't really thought it through completely. It seems like in this
> case, an initial loser could end up the winner if enough of the asset
> votes were cast for that person.  But it's probably not a good idea -
> just a passing thought.
>
>
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