[EM] Remember Toby

[Dave Ketchum]

On Jun 1, 2011, at 2:26 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> 2011/6/1 Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
> On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:
> It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
> and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
> There are several Condorcet methods that are clone proof and
> monotonic without being too complicated.
>
> Let's start by narrowing the field:
>
> Let's not. Choosing a voting system is a trade-off, and using a  
> single argument to eliminate a system or class of systems from  
> consideration is not helpful.

I offered a way for Condorcet to welcome Approval backers without them  
having to learn all that Condorcet offers - until they develop  
interest in what it can do.  Also did not narrow the field within  
Condorcet.
>
> I'm sure I could come up with some honest, logical arguments against  
> your choice of systems, whatever that may be. The point of choosing  
> a common proposal to put forward, while still supporting a range of  
> systems, is that just arguing leads nowhere.
>
> A common proposal is not going to satisfy everyone. But it  
> absolutely must be extremely simple to understand. I've seen four  
> proposals in this thread that pass that test for me:
> - Approval
      Perhaps salable to those liking simplicity - but weak in  
desirability.
> - DYN
      A bit more ability - but who, thinking, really wants to end here  
- or see this leading to a good destination.
> - Condorcet/Approval
      At first glance this sounds as if headed where I would lead,  
BUT.  Does fine when there is a CW.  If not it interprets the ballot  
as if voted for Approval.  Trouble with that is incompatibility - for  
Condorcet it can be useful to give low ranks to those you do not  
really like in case all you like better and rank higher lose; for  
Approval you only want to vote for those you truly like.

      One attempt at recovery is that, in the Approval step, ignore  
those ranked lowest for Condorcet.  This may help some though, for the  
counters it asks for something they had no need to know except for  
this Approval step.  I argue that we have plenty of valid ways to  
handle Condorcet cycles.

> - Minimax Condorcet
      Narrowing the field - how to handle cycles is something to leave  
open for the moment.
>
> I'd suggest a fifth:
> - MYND - that is, just DYN, with a two-way runoff if there's a  
> (M)ajority failure, or if the second-place majority-approved  
> candidate demands it. This is essentially a "work it out, guys"  
> threat to keep any negotiation between near-clones grounded in the  
> voters' will, as all of the above are in some way vulnerable to a  
> game of chicken between supporters of near-clones.
>
> None of these are my favorite systems in theory, but any of them  
> would be a huge practical step up from plurality.
>
> I would still enthusiastically support more-complex systems, but I  
> don't think that they're the most efficient use of our advocacy  
> energy.
>
> JQ
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20110602/4b8f2c1b/attachment.htm>