[EM] Single Contest

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sat Jul 23 14:22:06 PDT 2011


Hi Forest,

Well, the interesting thing about my own Single Contest method is not
that it's an instant runoff between two finalists (i.e. a pairwise
comparison). I can't claim to have invented that. The interesting thing
is how resistant to ranking strategies it is.

The compromise incentive is not that impressive, but for all other types
it's very good, and on the overall sincerity figure there is often no
contest (e.g. the 94.2% in my recent post, vs. e.g. WV's 73.4%).

--- En date de : Sam 23.7.11, fsimmons at pcc.edu <fsimmons at pcc.edu> a écrit :
> If one of the finalists is chosen by
> a method that satisfies the majority criterion, then you can
> skip step 
> one, and the method becomes smoother.
> 
> Here are some possibilities for the method that satisfies
> the majority criterion:  DSC, Bucklin, and the 
> following range ballot based method:

Of course, the strategies of these methods will have an effect on the
overall quality. If you use a method with high truncation incentive
then the approval cutoff dilemma is basically still there.

DSC is a little underwhelming for me. It is very easily confused by
noise in the ballots. If you vote some random candidate along with your
other favorites, intending to be counted in the solid coalition for
the latter, you won't. Your write-in vote, or whatever, causes you to
get dropped out completely.

DSC also usually tests worse than IRV (due to compromise and burial
incentives) despite being monotone.
 
> Elect the candidate X with the greatest value of p such
> that more than p/2 percent of the ballots rate X at 
> least p percent of the maxRange value.
> 
> That method is similar to the one that Andy Jennings
> suggested recently, and which I think could be the 
> method to choose the other finalist:
> 
> Elect the candidate Y with the greatest value of p such
> that at least p percent of the ballots rate Y at p 
> percent of the maxRange value or higher.

These are interesting methods.

I will have another post to discuss automated approval, which I've also
been experimenting with.

Kevin Venzke




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