[EM] HBH

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Mon Jul 18 16:31:27 PDT 2011


Hi Forest,

So here's my summary using a 4-slot ballot and 3 candidates let's say.

The "pecking order" is the Range order. Assume no ties.

The "proximity" between two candidates is the smaller of 6 (3*2), and 
the product of the two candidates' ratings, summed from each ballot.

When finding the nearest candidate to another specific candidate,
break ties such that higher pecking order placement means one is closer.
(Assuming, I suppose, that a higher-order candidate wants to go later.)

Pairwise contests are determined by majority wins if available. 
Otherwise the pecking order winner wins.

You start the method with V = the Range loser generally. Call him "C."
Find the most distant candidate from C, call him "B." Eliminate the
loser of the pairwise contest (according to the above paragraph), which
leaves you with either B or C to compare to A, who is by default the
furthest candidate from whoever is left.

I understand the Plurality argument. Still wrapping my head around the
monotonicity and compromise ones. I get what the latter mechanic is 
doing, I just wonder if it can really be that easy?

Strategy-wise I am a bit concerned that your raw Range score is going
to be important more often.

I'll implement it when I get a moment.

Kevin



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