[EM] Composite methods (Re: Eric Maskin promotes the Black method)

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> 
> i was looking for Kristofer's posts to EM and came across this, i may 
> have missed it:
> 
> On Jun 22, 2011, at 5:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> 
>> I've mentioned it before, but I think Condorcet enjoys an additional 
>> advantage here. Say there's a CW and he is not elected. Then that 
>> means a majority prefers the CW to the candidate who was elected, and 
>> if that majority is annoyed enough, it could try to repeal the voting 
>> method in question. However, if the method always elects the CW, any 
>> attempt to do so must face a majority who did prefer that CW to all 
>> the other candidates, and if that majority feels the candidate is good 
>> enough, they can block the repeal by virtue of being a majority.
>>
> 
> it's curious to me, Kristofer, that this is a theorem that states that 
> Condorcet-compliant will eventually, naturally become the norm because 
> eventually the majority will be well aware of their status (as the 
> majority) and know their loss, be outraged, and change the system to 
> something different.  until Condorcet is landed on, there will always be 
> the probabilistic pressure to change to something different.
> 
> i dunno if i would be as optimistic as that.  i don't think that people 
> think about it.

No, I don't think it would be conscious. I don't think the voters would 
go about and think, to themselves "You know, I would really have liked 
Montroll to win, but since he didn't, I'm going to repeal the system". 
Instead, if the effect above is real, it would take the shape of, say, 
Wright-supporters and Montroll-supporters (or the fraction of the latter 
that didn't think long enough about that Montroll would also lose under 
Plurality or 40% TTR) could unite in the feeling that Kiss is no good. 
Thus united under the feeling that Kiss was the wrong choice, they could 
propose to repeal the system.

But now consider a parallel universe where the CW always won (and these 
victories were significant, i.e. people really preferred the CW to the 
rest). Say Montroll won. Then Kiss-supporters and Wright-supporters 
might try to unite in the feeling that Montroll wasn't what they wanted 
("we don't want any steenkin centrists"); but if they tried so, there 
would be a majority who did like Montroll (because he was the CW), and 
therefore these could block the repeal if it came to a referendum.

I'm making a lot of assumptions here. Perhaps Wright- and 
Montroll-supporters would be too different from each other to unite in 
that way, or perhaps there would never be a "we don't want any steenkin 
centrists" campaign in the alternate universe. I don't know enough about 
Burlington politics to say, but I hope it does show the shape of the 
indirect dynamics that would be in play, anyway.