[EM] Condorcet divisor method proportional representation

[Kathy Dopp]

On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:20 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
<km_elmet at lavabit.com> wrote:

> If you want to minimize unhappiness of the voters by electing candidates
>  hated by few, you can make the same kind of argument against the majority
>  criterion for a single-winner method as you did against the Droop
> proportionality criterion. That is, imagine an election of the sort:
>
> 51: Left > Center > Right
> 45: Right > Center > Left
>  4: Center > Right > Left.
>
> The majority criterion forces Left to win in a single-winner election.
> However, Left is hated by 49% of the voters.

Yes. Of course I totally agree that with a rank choice ballot, the
Droop quota also is not a good idea.  (Droop quota is the same as
majority in a single winner election.)

>
> Borda, which fails the majority criterion, would elect Center as a
> compromise. Center is not hated by any of the voters, and so by your metric,
> that would be a better outcome.

Yes. I agree completely with that.

>
> Yet I suppose that since you like the Condorcet criterion, you also like
>  the majority criterion that it implies. That means that some methods (like
> Borda) can be *too* centrist by your/the Condorcet measure.

Huh!?  One obviously is not equivalent to the other, so "No".

Sorry. Too busy today to go through the rest of your statements currently.


-- 

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."

Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections
http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174

View some of my research on my SSRN Author page:
http://ssrn.com/author=1451051