[EM] Vote mirroring as a counter-monopoly measure
Michael Allan
mike at zelea.com
Fri Jul 29 04:56:28 PDT 2011
If the argument of this essay is sound, then it may have some bearing
on how we advocate for particular voting methods in future.
Otherwise, I'm afraid it may be a little off topic. I hope to re-post
it soon to a larger, more Internet-related list - if it can stand up
to critique. Can anyone see gross flaws or omissions in the argument?
VOTE MIRRORING AS A COUNTER-MONOPOLY MEASURE [0]
Vote mirroring is arguably a sufficient measure in itself to preclude
the formation of a monopoly in the provision of online voting services
for participatory democracy. A vote mirror can unilaterally
interconnect the voters of multiple service sites into a single
"inter-network" of participation and thus reduce the network effects
that might contribute to the dominance of a single provider. Social
media in general is prone to monopolies, but their formation is not
inevitable [1]. By posing an early challenge, vote mirroring can
level the playing field and preclude a monopoly in voting media.
Vote mirroring works by copying votes from particular service sites
(vote-servers), and reproducing them as images at another site (the
mirror) [2]. The technique is illustrated in figure 1 below. The top
half of the figure shows three vote-servers together with a sample of
their votes. Vote-servers A and C are providing communicative
services in which votes are delegated transitively, while server B is
providing a conventional mass service [3].
| |
A | B | C
| |
| |
(0) | | (0) (0)
(0) | | | (0) | 1 /
\ 1 | 1 | | \ | / 1
\ | | | \ 1 | /
(0) (0) \ | | | \ | / (0) (0)
\ 1 | \| | (0) | \ |/ | 1 /
\ | 1 (2) | (0) | | (3) | / 1
\ | | | \ 1 | 1 (0) | | | /
\| | 3 | \ | / | | 4 |/
(2) | | \ | / 1 | | (2)
\ 3 | | \ | / | (0) | / (0)
\ | (0) | (6)----(0) | \ 1 | / |
\ | / | 1 / \ 1 | \ | / (0) | 1
\ | / 1 | / \ | \ | / 3 \ |
\|/ | (0) 1 \ | \|/ 1 \|
(7) | (0) | (8) (2)
| |
--------------------+--------------------+------------------------
(0) D (0) (0)
(0) | (0) | 1 /
\ 1 | 1 \ | / 1
\ | \ 1 | /
(0) (0) \ | \ | / (0) (0)
\ 1 | \| (0) \ |/ | 1 /
\ | 1 (2) (0) | (3) | / 1
\ | | \ 1 | 1 (0) | | /
\| | 3 \ | / | 4 |/
(2) | \ | / 1 | (2)
\ 3 | \ | / (0) | / (0)
\ | (0) (6)----(0) \ 1 | / |
\ | / 1 / \ 1 \ | / 3 (0) | 1
\ | / 1 / \ \ | / \ |
\|/ (0) 1 \ \|/ 1 \|
(7) (0) (8) (2)
FIG 1. Vote mirroring. Three separate vote servers (A, B, C) and
a mirror that reproduces the votes of all three on a single
server (D). The number in brackets shows the quantity of
votes received by each candidate. Note that a candidate
may be a text, as well as a person. [4]
The mirror (bottom) reproduces the votes of all three servers. This
involves translating the votes from their various native formats on
the original servers into the single format used on the mirror.
Voting methods may differ greatly and the translation may therefore
entail a degree of information loss, making for an imperfect image.
Such imperfections cannot invalidate the overall technique, however,
because a best effort at an image is always a better reflection of
reality than no image at all. For example, knowing that these
particular votes (figure above) all concern a single issue, the mirror
has represented the four end-candidates as rivals, with 7, 6, 8 and 2
votes respectively, because this gives a truer picture of the options
available to the voters. [5]
USES OF A MIRROR
----------------
This section concerns the direct uses of vote mirroring by a
participant. The table below summarizes these uses for different
categories of participant together with associated costs and benefits.
Of the four uses shown, three are of benefit to the users of any
voting service, while the fourth is of benefit to users of mass voting
services in particular.
Table 1. Uses, costs and benefits for different categories of
participant.
Use of original vote server Use of mirror
============================== ==================================
SERVICE PARTICIPANT USE COST BENEFIT
TYPE ROLE (if any)
======= =========== ========== ============ =====================
Any Candidate Soliciting [5] Overview of voters,
votes Overview of rivals
----------- ---------- ------------ ---------------------
Voter Comparing Overview of
candidates candidates
---------- ------------ ---------------------
Voting User Convenience
registration
------- ----------- ---------- ------------ ---------------------
Mass Trailing Delegation User Visibility to voters,
candidate registration Viability as
candidate
==================================================================
Soliciting votes
----------------
A mirror can be used by a candidate as a tool for soliciting votes.
It provides two benefits for this purpose: an overview of all the
voters in a single interface, and a similar overview of the rival
candidates (compare top and bottom in figure 1). Seeing all the
voters is particularly beneficial, because online voting tends to be a
continuous process in which voters are free to shift their votes. [5]
Comparing candidates
--------------------
A mirror can be used by voters as a tool for comparing candidates.
The benefit it provides for this purpose is an overview of all
candidates, together with the "live" structure of their voter support.
Only a mirror can provide such an overview.
Voting
------
A mirror will typically provide a voting service of its own, making it
a combined mirror and vote-server. This is a convenience for any
voter who uses the mirroring part to compare candidates and then
wishes to shift his vote. Rather than having to register as a user on
the candidate's home server, he simply registers on whatever
mirror/vote-server he prefers. He can then shift his vote to any
candidate.
Delegation
----------
A mirror can provide a delegation service to a candidate on a mass
voting site, where it would otherwise be unavailable. This may be
particularly useful to a candidate who is trailing in votes, as it
increases both her visibility and viability. A new voter will often
explore upstream and inspect the supporting structure of votes before
deciding where to place his own vote. A candidate who presents
herself in that context is more likely to receive a vote than one who
appears as number 29 (or 229) in an ordered list.
| |
A | B | C
| |
| |
(0) | | (0) (0)
(0) | | | (0) | 1 /
\ 1 | 1 | | \ | / 1
\ | | | \ 1 | /
(0) (0) \ | | | \ | / (0) (0)
\ 1 | \| | (0) | \ |/ | 1 /
\ | 1 (2) | (0) | | (3) | / 1
\ | | | \ 1 | 1 (0) | | | /
\| | 3 | \ | / | | 4 |/
(2) | | \ | / 1 | | (2)
\ 3 | | \ | / | (0) | / (0)
\ | (0) | (6)----(0) | \ 1 | / |
\ | / | 1 / \ 1 | \ | / 3 (0) | 1
\ | / 1 | / \ | \ | / \ |
\|/ | (0) 1 \ | \|/ 1 \|
(8)----(0) | (0) | (8) (2)
1 | |
| |
-----------------------+--------------------+------------------------
(0) D (0) (0)
(0) | (0) | 1 /
\ 1 | 1 \ | / 1
\ | \ 1 | /
(0) (0) \ | \ | / (0) (0)
\ 1 | \| \ |/ | 1 /
\ | 1 (2) (3) | / 1
\ | | | | /
\| | 3 | 4 |/
(2) | (0) | (2)
\ 3 | (0) | (0) | / (0)
\ | (0) \ 1 | 1 (0) \ 1 | / |
\ | / \ | / \ | / 3 (0) | 1
\ | / 1 \ | / 1 \ | / \ |
\|/ 7 \ | / \|/ 1 \|
(14)------------(6)----(0) (8) (2)
1 / \ 1
/ \
(0) 1 \
(0)
FIG 2. Cross-server delegation in a mirror. A candidate on a mass
server (B) has cast a vote using a communicative server
(A). The mirror (D) recognizes this as delegation and carries the
6 votes of the first candidate to the second candidate for a total
of 14.
Note that up to three servers are involved. A delegate is both a
candidate and a voter. Here the role of candidate is provided by the
mass server (B) on which the delegate continues to receive her
original votes, while that of voter is provided by the second server
(A) on which she casts her own vote. The third server (D) is the
mirror that combines both roles and reveals her as a delegate. If the
mirror were to provide its own voting service as well, then it would
be more convenient to cast the delegating vote there directly. [6]
COUNTER-MONOPOLY EFFECTS OF MIRRORING
-------------------------------------
If the benefits outlined above are roughly accurate, then the
counter-monopoly effects are clear. Votes will shift in favour of
preferred candidates regardless of their home servers. Users will
tend to migrate to those servers that provide a convenient combination
of both mirroring and voting services, rather than relocating with
each vote shift. But any vote-server is capable of hosting a
mirroring service and sharing equally in the full extent of voter
participation [8]. A new server without any actual users, for
example, would still have all the voters. Such an advantage cannot
easily be dispensed with. Network effects are likely therefore to
entrench vote mirroring as a practice; and with that, no imbalance in
the distribution of users could ever tilt over into a monopoly [9].
Table 2. Non-defences against mirroring.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Defence Why it is likely to fail
---------------------- ------------------------------------------
Copyright Non-creative factual information is exempt
Closing data APIs Data scraped from user interfaces
Opaque client platform There is none, all can legally be hacked
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright
---------
This defence is ineffective because non-creative, factual information
is generally exempt from copyright protection. A vote conveys the
simple fact of assent or agreement, and people are free to inform
others of that fact.
Closing data APIs
-----------------
Closing the data APIs is an ineffective defence, because the data
necessary for vote mirroring can instead be scraped from a user
interface. This defence would have to be combined with an opaque
client platform (below) in order to be effective.
Opaque client platform
----------------------
This defence is ineffective because no such platform exists. The only
opaque platforms with sufficent coverage to support a monopoly bid are
Flash and Java, both of which have open source implementations on the
client side [10]. An open source client can always be hacked and
internally scraped.
Table 3. Defences against mirroring.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Defence Cost
---------------------- ------------------------------------------
Secret ballot Lower credibility of results,
De-socializing the medium
------------------------------------------------------------------
Secret ballot
-------------
In this defence, the identity of the voter is kept hidden. This is an
effective defence because votes cannot accurately be imaged without
knowing the voters' identities [7]. One of the costs associated with
this defence is a lower credibility of results. Methods of verifying
private votes exist, but none is so simple and credible as the method
of full disclosure available to public vote-servers.
Another cost is the de-socializing of the medium. This is more
serious, because the social attractions of a medium are largely
eliminated if the participants can no longer identify each other. It
is unclear therefore how this defence could be reconciled with a
competitive strategy, especially one in which the goal is a monopoly.
CONCLUSION
----------
There is no viable defence against vote mirroring. The immediate
effects of mirroring are sufficient in themselves to prevent the
formation of a monopoly in voting services.
[0] A working draft of this essay is posted at
http://zelea.com/w/User:Mike-ZeleaCom/Vote_mirroring_as_a_counter-monopoly_measure
[1] Public telephone networks are an example of a social media
monopoly. Online examples are Twitter, Facebook and Skype.
Email is a counter example.
[2] Vote mirroring is the invention of Thomas von der Elbe. See the
original description:
http://zelea.com/w/User:ThomasvonderElbe_GmxDe/Vote_mirroring
[3] On the distiction between communicative and mass voting, see:
http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#medium
[4] How a candidate may be both a person and a text is described at:
http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#candidate
http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#action-norm
[5] Vote mirroring depends on knowing whether two sets of votes on
otherwise distinct servers are concerned with a common issue.
When they are, the candidates receiving the votes may faithfully
be represented as rivals in a common pool of voters. The method
of determining this on a case by case basis is still under
active development (mid-2011), but probably the users of the
mirror are the best qualified for the decision work, as they
have the most at stake. In that case, it would have to be
accounted as a cost of using the mirror.
[6] If the vote were cast instead on mirror D, then the total for
the end candidate on server A would have remained 7. It would
be incorrect in any case, as the results calculated on all the
non-mirroring servers (A, B, C) are incomplete. None of them
takes into account the full set of votes on the issue.
[7] Vote mirroring depends on shared standards of voter
identification and authentication. These may be grouped
together under the category of "voter registration". Voter
registration differs from user registration in tying the user's
identity to a physical place of residence, among other
real-world properties. The purpose of voter registration is not
only to establish the user's eligilibility for voting on local
issues, but also to prevent the user from multiplying his votes
under false identities (sock puppets). The dependency on voter
registration is not particular to vote mirroring, but is shared
by voting in general; vote mirroring need only be sensitive to
the various methods of registration employed on the
vote-servers.
The dependency is moot, however, because no public vote-server
currently implements and enforces voter registration. Users on
any server may employ sock puppets if they wish. Vote mirroring
might make the practice somewhat easier to get away with, but
the incentive and opportunity to exploit this at an effective
scale would depend on vote mirroring itself becoming entrenched
as a practice. In that light, the problem goes beyond the scope
of this essay. But the solution is simply to enforce voter
registration when it becomes necessary. The costs of that
enforcement will be easier to bear after the problem has exposed
itself.
[8] Glossed over in the main text is the requirement of shared
standards for the replication of the mirrors themselves.
(Thanks to Alex Rollin for pointing out this omission.) Such
standards include issue identification and voter registration
[5][7]. It may be enough to say that the requirement is not
absolute. Having two sets of standards that are mutually
incompatible would not result in the fragmentation of the
mirroring inter-network into two halves, but only in the
creation of two inter-networks that were layered, as it were,
one atop the other. Each would be complete in itself and would
reveal the full complement of participants. The individual user
would then have a choice of which to frequent. In other words,
a mirroring inter-network may itself be mirrored, and it follows
that none could ever be locked in by network effects and imposed
as a kind of monopoly solution.
[9] Crucially vote mirroring unbinds the role of participant from
that of user. Only the former is subject to network effects,
and unbound it can no longer reinforce an imbalance in the
latter. A user is free to choose her own vote-server based on
quality of service, but that choice will not affect the fact of
her broader participation and thereby the choices of others.
[10] Java itself is open source. For Flash clients, there is
Lightspark. http://sourceforge.net/apps/trac/lightspark
--
Michael Allan
Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/
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