[EM] PR for USA or UK

[Toby Pereira]

________________________________

From: Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
To: election-methods at electorama.com
Sent: Sun, 24 July, 2011 20:34:33
Subject: Re: [EM] PR for USA or UK


Hello again.

--- En date de : Dim 24.7.11, Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :
>>Strategy-resistant systems do have certain advantages as you say, 
>>but in the single-winner case it would end up reducing range to a 
>>Condorcet method, which arguably isn't as good, and ends up pushing 
>>out a "better-liked" candidate for one that strictly more people 
>>prefer. And this is what I like about range - it's not just about 
>>which candidates you prefer to which other ones, but by how much. 

>I think the Range method itself is pretty incapable of this, but you
>could do it either with rated ballots or with a rank ballot that has
>truncation incentive.

Is a range ballot not a rated ballot?


>>And as long as strategy isn't performed better by voters of some >candidates 
>>than others, the fact that there would still be some 
>>
>>honest voters would mean that the advantages of range would still 
>>remain to an extent, meaning that overall better-liked candidates 
>>stand a better chance, and it therefore reflects better the overall
>>preferences of the electorate!

>That paragraph makes sense if you're comparing Range to Approval, but 
>not Range to anything else. If large numbers of voters use strategy in
>Range (and I'm pretty sure they would be encouraged to; personally I
>wouldn't need any encouraging) this will destroy so much information 
>that the only way Range will win out is if the rank methods you compare
>it to contain even more destructive incentives than Range has.

With a single-winner election, the full strategy option is to vote approval 
style, but I'm not sure if this is as clear for PR. You say you wouldn't need 
any encouraging to vote strategically - I wouldn't either to be honest - but 
what is the optimal strategy? In any case, if range does turn out to be 
problematic, proportional approval voting would be my next choice. I don't like 
ranked ballots because you don't know how much the voter actually likes each 
candidate or whether they like them at all.

>Can you explain your position without saying "party"? Because if you 
>didn't see the parties, and only saw voters, it would be indefensible 
>to give a seat to the 32%. There would be nothing special about that 
>group.

Candidates A and B are both fairly similar and 68% of voters vote for both of 
these approval-style and no-one else. Candidates C and D are also similar to 
each other and 32% of voters vote for both of these approval style and no-one 
else. That's the example set out without parties. And it's the same as before - 
if 50% of the voters voted for A and B it would be exactly the right 
proportion (without rounding due to a specific number of seats) for one of A or 
B to be elected, and if 100% voted for them, it would eb exactly the right 
proportion for both seats. 75% is halfway.
>Hi Toby,
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