[EM] PR for USA or UK

[Toby Pereira]

I've replied to Jameson and Kevin in the same post here, so hopefully it's come 
out alright!


________________________________
From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
To: Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk>
Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
Sent: Sun, 24 July, 2011 2:50:12
Subject: Re: [EM] PR for USA or UK

>I agree that PRV would give better results, with sophisticated voters, than most 
>forms of PR. However, it does fail my criterion 4 (simple ballots) and do worse 
>>than SODA-PR on criteria 5(smooth transition) and even arguably 1(true 
>proportionality - because separate districts spoil the proportionality). If you 
>don't think >these criteria are reasonable, you should give that argument. 
>


>I started out with a list of criteria because I think that's the right place to 
>start when you're looking for a practical system.

>JQ
 
I don't necessarily think sophisticated voters are required in order to ensure 
reasonable PR under PRV. I think as long as you don't get some candidates who 
have much better strategic voters than others, it should do OK.
 
I would argue that my system doesn't fail on simple ballots. It's not all or 
nothing. Yes, there are simpler ballots, but if I was rating simplicity of 
ballots approval style, I'd approve range ballots! But seriously, scores out of 
6 is quite simple, and it could be made quite clear that you only need to rate 
candidates that you have any positive feeling towards. Blanks would count as 
zero. Some may argue for an average score to be given to blanks, but I think 
that would actually encourage people to fill out a load of zeros anyway. SODA-PR 
is probably simpler, but I think the delegable/non-delegable thing would be a 
bit confusing for voters and so wouldn't be simple in their minds. I know that 
it's arguably better to have the one vote and let your favourite candidate 
delegate (given that they probably have similar views to you) than dilute with 
several approvals, but why not just let candidates have their own delegation 
list - i.e. STV - and do away with the approval aspect completely (since you 
don't approve of voters actually voting approval style under your system 
yourself)?
 
Smooth transition - yes, PRV a bigger step from FPTP in some ways than SODA-PR 
(giving candidates a score is further from a single X than approval-style 
votes), but the idea of giving your vote to the candidates to delegate is a 
pretty big paradigm shift in itself, and arguably causes it to fail on this 
criterion. Still, if we ever were to have PR in the UK, it would probably be STV 
anyway (don't know about in the US), which I would argue is no more or less 
smooth a transition than PRV from the starting point of FPTP. So for smooth 
transition, I don't think PRV fails, because I think it ties with the realistic 
(UK) frontrunner.
 
Separate constituencies do spoil proportionality to an extent, yes. There would 
only be a certain number of seats available in each. If it was six, then a party 
with constant 10% support across the county would struggle to get anything. 
What's the alternative? We could have bigger constituencies, but that means 
bigger ballots, or party lists, but I don't like them. I'm not sure I get your 
district/co-district thing though. In any case, I think this is a problem of how 
we sort out districts/constituencies, rather than anything against PRV per se.
 
Also, I don't get the whole thing about write-ins. Maybe it's a UK/US divide 
thing, but surely if you want to be elected then you stand for election. 
Therefore your name would be on the ballot.
 
 

________________________________

From: Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
To: election-methods at electorama.com
Sent: Sun, 24 July, 2011 5:38:18
Subject: Re: [EM] PR for USA or UK

>Hi Toby,
 
Hello.

>I really don't know what "dishonest results" means. Judging by your
>example below it apparently requires comparing two different methods.
>So, I can make any method give "dishonest results" just by inventing
>a different method that requires dishonesty from everyone. Now every 
>other method in the world is cheating.
 
I suppose what I mean is that by transferrig your vote for you, STV ends up 
producing the same result (in my simple case) as PRV with strategic voting, and 
to me it's an ugly result.

>It's not a bad description that strategy-resistant systems "do the
>strategy for you." This has important results:

>1. The voters do not need to do the strategy
>2. So the playing field is leveled
>3. So votes should have correct effect in proportion to the number,
>meaning the outcome is more accurate. That is, it reflects better the
>overall preferences of the electorate.
 
Strategy-resistant systems do have certain advantages as you say, but in the 
single-winner case it would end up reducing range to a Condorcet method, which 
arguably isn't as good, and ends up pushing out a "better-liked" candidate for 
one that strictly more people prefer. And this is what I like about range - it's 
not just about which candidates you prefer to which other ones, but by how much. 
And as long as strategy isn't performed better by voters of some candidates than 
others, the fact that there would still be some honest voters would mean that 
the advantages of range would still remain to an extent, meaning that overall 
better-liked candidates stand a better chance, and it therefore reflects better 
the overall preferences of the electorate!

>>On my website I give an example where party A has 68% of the support 
>>and party B 32%. There are two seats and so each party fields two 
>>candidates. Assuming everyone would vote approval style, under my 
>>system, they would win one each. Party A would need over 75% of the 
>>votes to win the second seat. I would argue that this is a fair result 
>>(75% being bang in the middle between 50% and 100% - the amount to 
>>exactly earn one and two seats).

>How is 50% the amount to get one seat?
 
I mean that it's the exact proportional amount without any rounding. One seat = 
50% of two seats. That's all I meant. Also 0% is the exact proportional amount 
for zero seats and 100% is the exact amount for two seats, so they have a linear 
relationship. So it's not too much of a stretch to say that 75% = 1.5 seats and 
a reasonable cut-off.

>> Of course party A voters could 
>>coordinate themselves and split into two factions of 34% to take both 
>>seats, but this would be very hard for them to achieve. STV (Droop 
>>quota anyway) would transfer the votes above the quota accordingly 
>>so that party A would win both seats, and give what I would regard 
>>as the less fair result.

>Ok, but it's not obvious that it is less fair. You are according a
>privilege to the weaker party just because it is a different party.

I'm not according them a privilege because they are a different party, but 
because I would see it as logical and fair that 75% is a reasonable cut-off. If 
a system made the cut-off at 80%, I'd argue that it was unfair in favour of the 
smaller party.
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