[EM] An interesting real election

[Andrew Myers]

Yes, notice that if someone now votes 2 > 1 > 6, the Schulze method 
picks 1 over 2, which is the opposite of what the new voter wanted.

But I'm not really trying to criticize the Schulze method here -- 
perhaps the most salient thing is how rarely situations like this come 
up in Condorcet voting.

-- Andrew

On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Aaron Armitage wrote:
> 1 has a path to 6 at least as strong as 6's path to 1, namely 1>3>6, at
> 15-11 and 14-11. It
> seems a little odd, to me at least, that 6's path to 1 should benefit 2
> but not 6 itself.
> Starting from the top seems the only way of ensuring that the path that
> orders the two
> candidates relative to each other is the one which actually contributes
> to the final outcome.
>
> --- On *Sat, 1/29/11, Andrew Myers /<andru at cs.cornell.edu>/* wrote:
>
>
>     From: Andrew Myers <andru at cs.cornell.edu>
>     Subject: [EM] An interesting real election
>     To: "Election Methods Mailing List" <election-methods at electorama.com>
>     Date: Saturday, January 29, 2011, 4:40 PM
>
>     Here is an unusual case from a real poll run recently by a group
>     using CIVS. Usually there is a Condorcet winner, but not this time.
>     Who should win?
>
>     Ranked pairs says #1, and ranks the six choices as shown. It only
>     has to reverse one preference. Schulze says #2, because it beats #6
>     by 15-11, and #6 beats #1 by 14-13. So #2 has a 14-13 beatpath vs.
>     #1. Hill's method ("Condorcet-IRV") picks #6 as the winner.
>
>     -- Andrew
>
>     		1. 	2. 	3. 	4. 	5. 	6.
>     1.
>     		- 	13 	15 	17 	16 	13
>     2.
>     		9 	- 	13 	14 	17 	15
>     3. 		11 	11 	- 	13 	15 	14
>     4.
>     		9 	10 	10 	- 	14 	13
>     5.
>     		11 	10 	9 	10 	- 	13
>     6.
>     		14 	11 	11 	13 	10 	-