[EM] Least Expected Umbrage, a new lottery method

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at lavabit.com
Mon Dec 19 09:07:33 PST 2011


On 12/19/2011 01:50 AM, fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:
> Let M be the matrix whose row i column j element M(i,j) is the number
> of ballots on which i is ranked strictly above j plus half the number
> of ballots on which neither i nor j is ranked.
>
> In particular, for each k the diagonal element M(k , k) is half the
> number of ballots on which candidate k is unranked.
>
> Now think of M as the payoff matrix for the row player in a zero sum
> game.
>
> Elect the candidate that would be chosen by the optimal strategy of
> the row player.
>
> [End of Method Definition]

Is that method strategy-proof? If not, is there any way to determine 
whether a given stochastic method is strategy-proof or not? I know that 
some are (such as Random Pair, for instance).




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