[EM] Greatest-Mutual -Approval-Top (GMAT)

C.Benham cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Sun Dec 18 01:41:57 PST 2011


Mike,

Isn't it possible that that there could be more than one "mutual 
approval set" that meets the condition you specify?

And if yes, what then?  Just elect the most top-rated candidate in any 
of them, or the most top-rated candidate in the largest one?

Chris Benham


Mike Ossipoff wrote  (16 Dec 2011):

Greatest-Mutual-Approval-Top (GMAT):

(like MMT except that it requires only greatest mutual approval
instead of majority mutual approval)

A mutual approval set is a set of candidates all of whom are rated
above bottom by each member of the same majority of the voters--where
that set includes, for each ballot, at least one of that ballot's
top-rated candidates.

If there is a mutual approval set all of whose members are rated above
bottom by more voters than rate anyone else top, then the winner is the
most top-rated member of that set.

Otherwise the winner is the most top-rated candidate.

[end of GMAT definition]

GMAT meets FBC, avoids the ABE problem, provides majority rule protection,
and meets Mono-Add-Plump.

Methods that substitute something else for majority often seem to
add a little longer wording, or add a little wording complexity.

Therefore, I consider MMT to be the best public proposal. But GMAT is
my 2nd choice for best public proposal.

Mike Ossipoff





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