[EM] Chris: MMP's strategy incentives

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

In other words, supporters of less popular candidates choose
to support and elect a more popular compromise. 


 


If you know that your candidate is Plurality winner (and if
your only interest is electing hir), then you should middle-rate all of the
other candidates (at least the ones who aren’t potential Plurality rivals).,
thereby asking for membership in any and all mutual majority coalitions. Their
supporters will include you in their mutual majority coalitions (by
middle-rating you) only if they genuinely want to elect your candidate as a
compromise, more popular then their candidates, and better than the others.


 


Again:


 


In other words, supporters of less popular candidates choose
to support and elect a more popular compromise.


 


Burial:


 


Bottom-rating a candidate only has the effect of not
inviting hir to a coalition. How devious or offensively aggressive is that?


 


If you’re only interested in electing your favorite, and you
think you can, then don’t middle-rate any candidate who might rival your
favorite’s top-ratings total. That isn’t devious burying. It’s the common-sense of not helping rivals.


 


Summary:


 


The expressions “random-fill” and “burial” are intended for other
methods, and don’t apply to MMT.


 


MMT doesn’t have the problems that those terms refer to.


 


Forest—


 


Could LRV, due to the bottom symmetrical completion,
sometimes have an ABE-like problem, if the numbers were somewhat different
from those of the usual ABE? Could it have a co-operation/defection problem for
that reason?


 


Mike Ossipoff


 
 		 	   		  
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