[EM] How to vote in IRV
C.Benham
cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Wed Dec 7 08:26:14 PST 2011
Mike,
Similar to the good Approval strategy "approve the candidate A you would
vote for in FPP, plus all the candidates you like as much or better than
A" as an IRV strategy guide is "vote in first place the candidate A you
would vote for in FPP and in second place the candidate B that you would
vote for in FPP if A wasn't on the ballot and in third place the
candidate C you would vote for in FPP if neither A or B was on the
ballot, and so on."
So barring rare and risky Push-over strategy opportunities, I don't see
how IRV voting strategy is qualitatively more difficult than FPP strategy.
> When there are completely unacceptable candidates who might
> win (I call that condition u/a, for “unacceptable/acceptable”)
>
> IRV, like many methods, has a relatively simple strategy:
When the voter's over-riding priority is to prevent the election of an
unacceptable candidate, the voter should rank the acceptable candidates
in order of estimated pairwise strength versus the likely unacceptable
finalist (i.e. the unacceptable candidate that isn't eliminated before
the final virtual run-off).
> Ideally, then rank the unacceptables in order of some
> complicated combination of their disutility and
> (some guessed or complicatedly-calculated measure of) their popularity.
>
>
>
> Actually, ignore that last paragraph.
There is no reason at all to not rank the unacceptables sincerely. If
your ranking among the unacceptables is ever counted it means that your
strategy (aimed at preventing the election of an unacceptable candidate)
has failed, and if any are even slightly less bad than the very worst
you might as well help the lesser evil (unless you are concerned about
your vote's symbolic gesture and want to deny any unacceptable winner
"legitimacy").
> What’s that you say? You might get lucky, even if you don’t
> top-rank a compromise?
I think the voter very probably will, and most of the time will have
sufficient information to "know" that s/he can safely vote hir sincere
ranking.
> “Step right up, folks, and pick a card!”
>
>
>
> IRV, a game of chance, should only be allowed in states that
> allow gambling.
I won't bother, but I think it is at least as easy to argue that
Approval is "a game of chance".
Chris Benham
Mike Ossipoff wrote (6 Dec 2011):
How to vote in IRV:
When there are completely unacceptable candidates who might
win (I call that condition u/a, for “unacceptable/acceptable”)
IRV, like many methods, has a relatively simple strategy:
Rank the acceptable candidates in order of (some guessed or
complicatedly-calculated measure of) their popularity.
Ideally, then rank the unacceptables in order of some
complicated combination of their disutility and
(some guessed or complicatedly-calculated measure of) their popularity.
Actually, ignore that last paragraph. In u/a, all the
unacceptables are just unacceptable. What matters is the election of an
acceptable instead of an unacceptable.
In u/a, IRV is just ranked Plurality. In Plurality you vote
for the acceptable candidate who is most popular (most likely to get the
most
votes).
The difference is that the needed measure of popularity is
simpler in Plurality (Which of the acceptables will be the best
votegetter?). In that (decisive)
regard, Plurality is better than IRV.
Oh, and, by the way, our public political elections are u/a.
IRV’s LNHa and LNHe:
Some boast that IRV meets those two criteria.
Well, if your 2nd choice gets your vote,
your favorite, by that time, is beyond help or harm, isn’t s/he.
Let’s protect hir from harm from your 2nd choice
vote, by expelling hir from the election. :-)
…A sort of electoral euthanasia.
In IRV, you don’t have to
be afraid to vote your 2nd choice necessary compromise at
least in 2nd place. In fact you have to be afraid to not rank hir
alone in 1st place.
So, you see, IRV takes LNHa one step farther :-)
What’s that you say? You might get lucky, even if you don’t
top-rank a compromise?
“Step right up, folks, and pick a card!”
IRV, a game of chance, should only be allowed in states that
allow gambling.
Mike Ossipoff
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