[EM] how primary forecasts work

David L Wetzell wetzelld at gmail.com
Fri Dec 16 13:14:19 PST 2011


http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/how-our-primary-forecasts-work/

this is interesting and raises the issue of how things wd change when an
alternative election rule is used.

I think the uncertainty would go up.

dlw

On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 2:02 PM, <
election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:

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>   1. Greatest-Mutual -Approval-Top (GMAT) (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
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> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 19:58:39 +0000
> Subject: [EM] Greatest-Mutual -Approval-Top (GMAT)
>
> Greatest-Mutual-Approval-Top (GMAT):
>
> (like MMT except that it requires only greatest mutual approval
> instead of majority mutual approval)
>
> A mutual approval set is a set of candidates all of whom are rated
> above bottom by each member of the same majority of the voters--where
> that set includes, for each ballot, at least one of that ballot's
> top-rated candidates.
>
> If there is a mutual approval set all of whose members are rated above
> bottom by more voters than rate anyone else top, then the winner is the
> most top-rated member of that set.
>
> Otherwise the winner is the most top-rated candidate.
>
> [end of GMAT definition]
>
> GMAT meets FBC, avoids the ABE problem, provides majority rule protection,
> and meets Mono-Add-Plump.
>
> Methods that substitute something else for majority often seem to
> add a little longer wording, or add a little wording complexity.
>
> Therefore, I consider MMT to be the best public proposal. But GMAT is
> my 2nd choice for best public proposal.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
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