[EM] FBC failure for acquiescing coalition methods

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

Mike,

I think your example applies to all acquiescing coalition methods that we have considered.  The failure is 
caused by someone leap frogging over others to get to the top position. 

But I think that most of these methods satisfy this FBC like property: 

If the winner changes when (on some ballot) candidate X is moved to the top slot along with all of the 
candidates that were ranked above X, then the new winner will be X or one of the other candidates that 
were raised on that ballot.

This seems like a reasonable substitue for the FBC, since it builds into it a consistency requirement, 
namely that if you raise X. then sincerity requires raising to the same level or higher all candidates that 
you prefer over X.

Forest

> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF 
> To: 
> Subject: [EM] Forest: I found an FBC failure for Minimal Aquiescing
> Majorities-Top
> Message-ID: 
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> 
> Forest--
> 
> Say it's like the ABE, except that there's one more candidate, D.
> 
> In the ABE, you were an A voter, but now, with D in the 
> election, you like D best, 
> with A your 2nd choice.
> 
> (Say all the A voters vote as you do)
> 
> The B voters, while willing to middle-rate A for a majority 
> coalition, wouldn't
> be willing to miiddle-rate D.
> 
> If you vote A & D together in 1st place, then your top-rating 
> for D means that
> {A,B} is no longer a winning set, because you vote D over B.
> 
> If you vote in that way, C wins.
> 
> But you can at least make A win, because the B voters are 
> willing to middle-rate A.
> 
> You can do that by top-rating only A. You can middle-rate D if 
> you want to.
> 
> Then, {A,B} wins, and, in that set, A wins with the most top votes.
> 
> You can get your best possible outcome (the election of A) only 
> by voting someone over
> your favorite.
> 
> Mike Ossipoff