[EM] Simple SODA strategy (post-election delegated phase)

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Thu Dec 15 10:54:18 PST 2011


Here's a simple strategy rule of thumb. I don't claim it's perfect strategy
in all cases, but it is in all the cases I've checked.

When it is your turn to assign delegated votes, find the "current Smith
set" (that is, counting all unassigned delegated ballots, including the
ones delegated to you, as preferences; and all undelegated or
already-assigned ballots as approvals). Approve all candidates whom you
prefer to at least one member of that set. As for the last member(s) of
that set, approve them if and only if, without your vote, (all of) your
most-preferred member(s) of the set would no longer be in the Smith set.
(The parenthetical plurals are to cover the case where you are indifferent
between certain members of the Smith set.)

Obviously, this strategy would be simpler to state in the common case where
there is a CW, that is, a one-member Smith set. Basically, assign approval
for everyone you prefer to the CW, and include the CW only if they need
your vote to win. And the result is almost always that the CW wins (except
in some cases with clonesets of 3 or more).

Again, this may be perfect strategy only (conservatively) >99% of the time;
but in the extremely rare case that it's not, I would expect somebody in
academia or the press to realize and publish that information in time for
the candidates to use correct strategy.

Jameson
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