[EM] How to vote in IRV

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Tue Dec 6 13:19:09 PST 2011


How to vote in IRV:


When there are completely unacceptable candidates who might
win (I call that condition u/a, for “unacceptable/acceptable”)

IRV, like many methods, has a relatively simple strategy:


Rank the acceptable candidates in order of (some guessed or
complicatedly-calculated measure of) their popularity.


Ideally, then rank the unacceptables in order of some
complicated combination of their disutility and 
(some guessed or complicatedly-calculated measure of) their popularity.


Actually, ignore that last paragraph. In u/a, all the
unacceptables are just unacceptable. What matters is the election of an
acceptable instead of an unacceptable.


In u/a, IRV is just ranked Plurality. In Plurality you vote
for the acceptable candidate who is most popular (most likely to get the most


The difference is that the needed measure of popularity is
simpler in Plurality (Which of the acceptables will  be the best votegetter?). In that (decisive)
regard, Plurality is better than IRV.


Oh, and, by the way, our public political elections are u/a.


IRV’s LNHa and LNHe:


Some boast that IRV meets those two criteria. 


Well, if your 2nd choice gets your vote,
your favorite, by that time, is beyond help or harm, isn’t s/he.


Let’s protect hir from harm from your 2nd choice
vote, by expelling hir from the election. :-)


…A sort of electoral euthanasia.


In IRV, you don’t have to 
be afraid to vote your 2nd choice necessary compromise at
least in 2nd place. In fact you have to be afraid to not rank hir
alone in 1st place.


So, you see, IRV takes LNHa one step farther :-)


What’s that you say? You might get lucky, even if you don’t
top-rank a compromise? 


“Step right up, folks, and pick a card!”


IRV, a game of chance, should only be allowed in states that
allow gambling.


Mike Ossipoff













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