[EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Peter Zbornik wrote:
> Hi Richard,
> 
> maybe a second round could take place between the winners of competing
> methods, say Schulze winner vs Approval or  Bucklin winner or any
> other endorsed method. This would allow for election-methods
> "competitions", and could address potential weaknesses of each method.
> When one of the method would generate a "bad" winner, then the other
> method could still give a "good" winner. For instance, if the Schulze
> method would generate a winner noone has heard of before (the dark
> horse), then in the second round, when he meets the Bucklin or
> Approval winner, he or she might lose the second round, after new
> details of his/her political past come to public knowledge due to the
> increased attention given. The election methods should be different
> for this approach to work. The obvious downside of this approach is
> increased complexity and thus less public support. With this method
> IRV might be used as one of the methods, or the old method could be
> used against the new method.

I'd like to add to this that plain old top-two runoff can have the 
honest CW win in a game-theory equilibrium if everybody communicates 
with everybody else, and there are only a few candidates. This is 
interesting, because Plurality has no such equilibrium. Perhaps an 
advanced runoff method could have such "candidates in honest X-sets will 
win under complete information" (X being Smith, Landau, whatnot) 
equilibria. It does seem that runoff methods can improve upon resistance 
to strategy, at least, because the last round is honest among the two 
candidates that remain.