[EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

[Jameson Quinn]

I have made some further changes to the
statement<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US>,
mostly to clarify the advantages and to speak of how this issue spans the
political spectrum; you may see them by looking at the doc.

Currently, I think that the weakest point of the statement is the
exhortation to look things up on Wikipedia. I suggest giving a bibliography,
and saying that "we do not endorse everything in every paper or book cited
in our bibliography, and in particular we do not believe that any negative
statement about the systems we have mentioned should be construed to imply
that the system criticized is worse than plurality overall." The
bibliography can include some Wikipedia articles, including "voting system",
but it should also include important scholarly articles, whether published
in peer-reviewed journals or not.

JQ

2011/8/29 Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>

> The latest changes to the voting reform consensus statement<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US&pli=1#>(copied from file:revision history. Changes show as green, apologies to
> those with text-only mail clients which won't show the difference between
> unchanged, new, and removed text.)
>
> ---------
>
> We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world,
> unanimously denounce the use of "plurality" voting in elections in which
> there are more than two candidates. In this declaration we offer several
> ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably
> produce much fairer results. The systems we suggest offer different
> advantages, but we agree to suggest the simplest of them, Approval voting,
> as a good first step to reform. We also endorse any of many possible
> proportional representation (PR) systems to solve the problems of
> gerrymandered single-seat elections for legislatures.
>
> .....
>
>  * Bucklin voting, which uses ranked ballots, and which initially counts
> only the most-preferred candidate on each ballot, and identifies a winner
> only if that candidate receives a majority of votes, and which successively
> adds consideration for lower-ranked candidates until a majority outcome is
> reached.
>
> * Condorcet methods, which use ranked ballots and pairwise counting to
> compare each candidate with each of the other candidates, with the winner
> being the candidate who is pairwise preferred over each and every other
> candidate. In some elections none of the candidates will win all of their
> pairwise comparisons, so there are variations that resolve these cases. In
> practical use, such situations will be rare, so while we may debate about
> which “cycle resolution” method is best, we unanimously endorse any of the
> various computable Condorcet methods which have serious advocates.
>
> * Majority Choice Approval, which uses score ballots, and elects a
> candidate with the highest median score. {footnote: Other similar
> median-based methods exist, and are sometimes called “Bucklin” methods. If
> the term “median” is too technical, they can be described equivalently as
> methods which attempt to pick the highest possible ratings threshold such
> that the winner is ranked above that threshold by a majority of voters. We
> would endorse such methods if there were a serious proposal to implement a
> specific one of them.}
>
> ....
>
>
> (The choice of counting method determines which kind of ballot is needed.)
>
> These methods have different advantages, and we disagree about which of
> them are the overall best systems for public elections. However, despite
> these disagreements, we can agree that Approval Voting represents a step
> towards whatever system we feel is ideal. It also has the advantage that it
> is a simple, well-defined system, with no room for distracting disagreements
> about trivial details. And of course, to reiterate, it would be a
> substantial improvement over plurality. Therefore, while few of us feel that
> Approval is the absolutely ideal system, we find that it is the best
> consensus endorsement, and we agree to work together to promote its
> adoption, without abandoning the right to individually promote others of the
> systems above.
>
>
> The Wikipedia articles about these methods provide detailed descriptions
> and characteristics of these methods.
>
> ....
>
>
> Most of us agree that an even better choice would be to adopt an election
> method in which the choice of who wins one seat interacts with who wins
> another equivalent seat in ways that ensure that the overall composition of
> the legislature at least roughly matches the preferences of the voters,
> especially in terms of political-party preferences. However, we disagree
> about which election method best serves this purposeThere are many systems
> for accomplishing this “proportional representation” (PR). While the
> signatories to this statement reserve our right to disagree with specific PR
> systems, we believe that the broad majority of such systems would be clear
> improvements over even the most impartially-drawn single-member districts,
> and would get our unanimous endorsement..
>
> Most European nations (but not the United Kingdom) use "party list” proportional
> representation" to match legislative representatives with the
> political-party preferences of the voters. Specifically, when electing
> members of parliament (MPs) by this method, voters not only vote for a
> candidate, but they also indicate their favorite political party.
> Proportional representation then makes adjustments to ensure that the
> percentage of legislative seats filled by members of each party roughly
> matches the percentage of voters who support each party. In other words, if
> 15% of the voters mark the Green Party as their favorite, then approximately
> 15% of the parliamentary seats are filled by Green Party politicians.
>
> Proportional representation methods typically use either "open lists",
> "closed lists", or “candidate-centric” methods to determine which
> politicians are selected. List-based systems differ from candidate-centric
> ones in that they firstat least some of the seats are first distributedthe seatsby party, then
> fill the seats that areand party candidates are chosen to fill those seats
> in a separate step. "won" by a party. The open-list approach allows voters
> to express preferences about which candidates they prefer for filling their
> party's seats. In the closed-list approach, the political party creates the
> ordered list from which their party's seats are filled, and voters do not
> participate in influencing the closed list.
>
> Almost all of us agree that where proportional representation is used, a
> candidate-centric or open-list approach should be used. We oppose the
> closed-list approach because it transfers power to people who are not
> elected, and who cannot easily be removed from their position of power.
>
>
> In governments where a single legislative representative is elected from
> each district or riding, a political manipulation named "gerrymandering" is
> used to influence the positions of district or riding boundaries. Such
> boundary manipulations affect which political party is favored to win the
> elections in each district or riding, and in turn this affects the
> legislative balance of power between political parties. It also reduces
> voter turnout because the election results are so difficult to change
> through voting.
>
> Unanimously we agree that gerrymandering is unfair.  Most PR systems would
> render gerrymandering more-or-less irrelevant, and we endorse these as the
> best solutions. We also note that there are PR systems which solve this
> problem while preserving a geographical link between a candidate and his or
> her constituents, and reject the idea that single-member districts should be
> kept to preserve this geographical link. Almost unanimously we agree that,
> if proportional representation cannot be achieved, gerrymandering still
> should be addressed with partial solutions. eEither better voting methods
> can be used to make the boundary positions much less influential in the
> balance of power between political parties, or that there are the
> boundaries can be chosen fairly and impartially ways to choose the
> boundaries. However, we do not agree on which such methods are best, so we
> are not recommending a specific solution to the gerrymandering problem.
>
>
>
> Overall our highest priority is to stop the use of plurality voting in
> elections that involve three or more choices, and to replace plurality
> voting with one of the alternative election methods recommended here.
>
> We, as election-method experts, have spent the last decade developing
> online resources about election methods, developing software for numerous
> election methods, and participating in online discussions to identify which
> election methods are worth adopting as replacements for plurality voting.
> Now we are sharing our recommendations. We also offer to share our deep
> understanding of election methods with policymakers and politically active
> citizens of any nation, state, province, municipality, or political party.We believe that it is no contradiction to state that better election methods
> could help both leftists, rightists, and others; both voters, incumbents,
> and upstart campaigners; and both centrists and extremists; each in very
> concrete and specific ways. People are too used to the fact that, in many
> cases, politics truly does amount to a zero-sum game between competing
> interests. Voting reform is different; this is an opportunity to move
> towards a healthier politics which could truly better-represent all groups.
> That is not to pretend that we offer a utopia, where conflicts of interest
> disappear and everyone is a winner. However, current voting systems choose
> pessimal options all too often, and better systems could bring incremental
> improvements for both winners and losers.
>
> We realize that election-method reforms are unlikely to start with people
> in positions of great power because they have made many sacrifices to
> achieve their power, and they do not want their efforts to be undermined.
>
> Therefore...
>
>
>
> 2011/8/29 Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>
>> Please do your work on the google doc<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US>. If
>> you understand how, please post the changes here when you're done (to help
>> involve others in the discussion).
>>
>> JQ
>>
>>
>> 2011/8/28 Richard Fobes <ElectionMethods at votefair.org>
>>
>>> I'll try to find a balance.  I too recognize the importance of starting
>>> by educating voters through non-governmental elections -- so that later it
>>> will be much easier to get fairer election methods adopted in governmental
>>> elections.  Yet I was wondering if maybe this explanation about Roberts
>>> Rules of Order was too long, and based on the feedback I'll try to shorten
>>> it.  Also I think I can merge it with another request to cover multiple
>>> rounds of voting, which is not yet covered -- and which also is important.
>>>
>>> The other two paragraphs I expect to keep in the next draft -- at the end
>>> as a part of the summary -- but they can be removed if they prove to be
>>> disliked.
>>>
>>> I'll start working on the next draft. It will be longer than the first
>>> because of all the additions that were requested, but fortunately I expect
>>> to be able to shorten it in a few places.
>>>
>>> Richard Fobes
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 8/28/2011 2:13 PM, Ralph Suter wrote:
>>>
>>>> Even if improving public elections is the statement's primary aim, that
>>>> needn't be its only aim -- nor, I'm convinced, should it be.
>>>>
>>>> One point I've tried to make is that one of the best practical means for
>>>> improving the prospects for reforming difficult-to-change public
>>>> elections would be to promote the use of alternative voting and
>>>> representation methods for use in non-public elections and other kinds
>>>> of decisionmaking processes (both public and non-public), including not
>>>> only formal ones such as organizational and formal meeting elections and
>>>> decisions but also informal ones that involve small and temporary groups
>>>> -- and for not only critically important decisions such as presidential
>>>> elections and constitutional referendums but also much less important
>>>> decisions such as groups of friends and co-workers deciding where to eat
>>>> lunch together. (For the latter, I believe approval voting and other
>>>> quick and simple methods are, in virtually all cases, indisputably
>>>> better than more complicated and time-consuming though maybe technically
>>>> superior ones.)
>>>>
>>>> The important things to keep in mind regarding this point are, first,
>>>> that it is much easier to experiment with alternative voting and
>>>> representation methods in other than public elections and, second, that
>>>> doing so has the great added advantage of helping educate people about
>>>> alternative methods and (hopefully) helping persuade much larger numbers
>>>> of people that some alternative methods would be great improvements over
>>>> plurality voting and single-representative legislative districts for use
>>>> in public elections.
>>>>
>>>> -RS
>>>>
>>>> On 8/28/2011 12:45 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I question adding this collection of paragraphs to the major
>>>>> declaration, which seems more aimed at improving public elections.
>>>>>
>>>> ----
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
>>
>
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