[EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version

[Dave Ketchum]

On Aug 23, 2011, at 9:06 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:

> I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to  
> write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the  
> election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just  
> providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take  
> advantage of this opportunity to ...
>
> * ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and  
> frustrated voters to take action, and ...
>
> * ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as  
> ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms.
>
> To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new  
> wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as  
> a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex  
> technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing  
> marketing materials.
>
> This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already  
> discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted.
>
> Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long.  
> Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other  
> version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's  
> what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra  
> words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most  
> people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed  
> purposes.
>
> Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies  
> our real areas of agreement.
>
> My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version  
> with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign  
> with much more enthusiasm.
>
> ----- The Declaration of Election-Method Experts -----
>
**
>
>
> Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality  
> voting is not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its  
> deficiency is that it does not collect enough preference information  
> from the voters in order to always correctly identify the most  
> popular candidate when there are more than two candidates.

The mention of "two choices" confuses.  The kind of ballot to be used  
must be decided, in at least most cases, before one can be certain how  
many candidates will be chosen from.  If nothing else, write-in  
candidates can mean the possibility of more choices.
>
> Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that  
> collect enough preference information to always, or almost always,  
> correctly identify the most popular candidate. The names and  
> descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order:
>
> * Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the  
> voter approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the  
> candidates who are not acceptable
>
> * Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a  
> first choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and  
> optionally indicates additional choices at lower preference levels
>
> * Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each  
> candidate, with the most familiar versions of such voting being to  
> rate something with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from  
> 1 to 10, but any range of numbers can be used
>
> The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an  
> academically recognized name, but the term "single-mark ballot" can  
> be used to refer to this primitive ballot type.
>
> Why is the unfairness of plurality voting not better known? Single- 
> mark ballots do not collect enough information to reveal the actual  
> preferences of voters in elections that have three or more  
> reasonably popular candidates. This lack of full preference  
> information makes it nearly impossible for anyone to produce clear  
> proof, or even evidence, of unfair election results.

The Approval ballot allows selecting one or more, but does not allow  
indicating preference among them.  When this same ballot was used in  
plurality it worked because the voter was only allowed to select one.

Perhaps the target of this discussion is desire to indicate more than  
one AND which are more or less desired.
>
>
**
>
> In addition to the four supported methods listed above, we also  
> support some combined methods. Specifically we support the use of  
> the Condorcet method to identify a "Condorcet winner" (who is  
> pairwise-preferred over all the other candidates) and then, if there  
> is no Condorcet winner, we support using either instant-runoff  
> voting (IRV) or approval voting to resolve the ambiguity and  
> identify a single winner.

Most, if not all, Condorcet methods use the same way to find the CW  
and, if found, declare that to be the winner.  If not found, different  
methods have their own way to find a winner.

I question involving IRV here.  Seems like, unless defending against  
such, that it would have its home problem of wrong choices.

Note that each member of the cycle would be the CW if all other cycle  
members were excluded.

Note also that they would have to be near ties to form a cycle.  Look  
at A>B>C>A.   Be easy to have B much weaker than A, and C much weaker  
than B, but then how could it happen that C was stronger than A.
>
>
> In the list of signatures we indicate which voting method each  
> signer most strongly prefers.
>
> Yet most of us also agree that we will support the adoption of any  
> of the supported methods, namely, in alphabetical order:
>
> * Approval voting
>
> * Bucklin voting
>
> * Any of the Condorcet methods, which are, in alphabetical order:
>
>  * Condorcet-Approval
>  * Condorcet-IRV

Again I choke on IRV getting near Condorcet, even though they use the  
same ballot.
>
>  * Condorcet-Kemeny
>  * Condorcet-Schulze
>  * Condorcet-Tideman
>
> * Range voting
>
> (The choice of counting method determines which kind of ballot is  
> needed.)

**

> Finally I'll close with a suggested format for signatures (where the  
> third portion indicates affiliation):
>
> Richard Fobes; Portland, Oregon, USA; VoteFair.org; prefers  
> Condorcet-Kemeny method