[EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give opinions

[robert bristow-johnson]

whoops, forgot to send to the list...

On 8/22/11 8:28 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> That's an argument of why Condorcet is a good system. What I was
> asking for was an argument of why Condorcet is more likely to be
> implemented, and/or less likely to be repealed, than Approval.
well, sorta you're right (in that i got sidetracked a little).

about 1. and 2a.  i tried to make the case why Condorcet is less likely 
to get repealed than *anything* else (IRV, Bucklin, Borda, Approval, 
Range), because i think that cycles will be rare and if a CW exists, no 
one will be able to claim that the election would have turned out any 
different if their guy ran up the CW in a two-candidate race and the old 
rules of simple majority and one-person-one-vote.

about 2. i don't wanna do nothing.  but we have experienced here in 
Burlington a vitriolic (even if by a thin majority) throwback and i 
dunno how, anytime soon after IRV was introduced, failed, and then 
rejected, that a voting reform that is incompatible with the simple 
mantra of "simple majority" and "one person one vote" will get any 
traction at all.  there is a thin hope that educating reasonable folk 
that were on both sides of the IRV debate that (assuming a CW) that 
ranked-choice decided by a Condorcet-compliant rule (and it better be 
simple, like either ranked pairs or minimax) continues to be compatible 
with the old system in the 2-candidate case (where we all agree who the 
winner is).

all we're doing differently is requiring the voter to make up their 
minds about their contingency vote (who they would vote for in the case 
of a delayed runoff) by Election Day.  then Condorcet is compatible with 
the old way and we're not asking voters to abandon their cherished 
values of "simple majority" and "one person one vote".  so, unless 
something pathological (like a cycle) is impending, how are voters 
burdened with a different strategy than they would have normally with a 
simple-majority race?  (the strategy being "vote sincerely".)

but Approval and Range require more and ask the voters to abandon either 
their expressivity they would get with a ranked ballot or require too 
much expressivity than the voter cares to deliver.  besides being no fun 
(of being able to say "Ra! Ra! Ra!" to your favorite candidate, among 
other approved candidates), Approval requires strategizing over whether 
or not to vote for one's second or third choices.  Range requires the 
voter to (in the case of sincere voting) estimate how much more they 
like or hate some candidate over some other (rather than the simpler 
decision that they would vote for some candidate over some other). 
that's a chore (and a lot of voter's will no do that chore).  in the 
case of insincere (strategic) voting, no voter will discard any "juice" 
that he or she gets with his/her franchise.  they have to decide how 
they will spend their marbles and no one will want to be a 1/2 vote.  if 
their only marking "10" (or whatever is full scale), Range degenerates 
to Approval (and Approval degenerates to FPTP if not forsaking your 
favorite candidate is salient).  Range is about as strategy-free as the 
board game called "Risk".

>
> Earlier you said why Approval being implemented and repealed would be
> bad. But that does not support Condorcet over Approval unless
> Condorcet is less likely to be repealed. I don't see that.

so, without using the Condorcet cycle as a horror story (that's another 
argument which is where we debate which Condorcet method is better), how 
is it that Condorcet, once adopted, will suffer the "elected wrong 
candidate" debacle which will motivate a successful repeal effort?

but i can see Approval and Range getting shot down (and with them, other 
voting reform efforts) in committee before ever being considered by a 
legislative body.  except, perhaps in some jurisdictions where they put 
judges and other non-partisan candidates (perhaps school board) up for 
election or retention.  i could see Approval used in those cases, but 
not for partisan public office like executive or legislative seats.

> And I certainly see Approval as more likely to be implemented;

i know, and i see it oppositely (except maybe for the "non-partisan" 
races i alluded to above).  we (ranked-choice advocates) educate voters 
on how it is compatible with the old way rather than educating them with 
a whole different decision-making method.  before they had to figure out 
which candidate they like better and that is unchanged with the ranked 
ballot (and Condorcet is the pairwise-consistent tabulation).  with 
Approval we have to educate voters on how they are going to have to 
decide to vote when they like their second choice, just not as much as 
their first.  and with Range, we have to educate voters on how they are 
going to further evaluate the candidate they like better as to how much 
better.  what is the answer you'll give voters you are educating about 
Approval or Range who ask such questions?

> it can unite more reformers and is simpler (especially once you get
> into arguments between Condorcet systems).

*which* Condocet system is a good debate to have after having the 
*whether* Condocet debate (in the public sphere).  otherwise "which" is 
sorta moot.  in the meantime, let the eggheads debate the "which" and 
provide the public with a digested answer or choice.

i would love it if the legislature was considering Condocet (any 
Condorcet) to the point they started to thrash out whether to adopt 
Schulze or Tideman or Simpson.

bestest,

r b-j

> JQ
>
> 2011/8/22 robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com
> <mailto:rbj at audioimagination.com>>
>
>
>
>     Well, to repeat a little of what i mailed you earlier, Jameson:
>
>     while i may agree with Laslier of the possible truth in fact:  "if
>     49% of the population strongly prefer A to B and 51% slightly
>     prefer B to A, I think that A is collectively preferable" (it *is*
>     ostensibly utilitarian), if one could consistently (for comparison
>     between individuals) and reliably measure individual strength of
>     preference.  sure, we can ask them, but every franchised voter is
>     a person of equal worth and everyone's vote is private, everyone
>     can bring their own motivations (including unjust motivations like
>     racial prejudice or debatably justified motivations like religious
>     belief) into the voting booth and express those motives on a
>     secret ballot. no voter can be compelled to reduce their political
>     worth for which they have equal franchise to.  so i would fully
>     disagree with the translation of what i think that Laslier is
>     pointing to: "if 49% of the electorate strongly prefer A to B and
>     51% slightly prefer B to A, then A should be elected"
>
>     no voter should be made to, and i don't even thing *asked* to,
>     voluntarily reduce the weight their electoral franchise.  every
>     person's vote must be of equal value. no voter should be able to
>     "multiply" the effect of their vote (say, by voting twice) which
>     is the fundamental principle behind "one-person-one-vote".  it's
>     gonna be pretty hard to get people to part with that principle.
>
>     presently people are using the two fundamental principles of
>     "Simple Majority" (whatever the hell *that* means, but they all
>     agree what it means for a 2-candidate election) and
>     "one-person-one-vote" to prop up their nearly religious belief
>     that nothing other than a traditional single-vote ballot decided
>     either by FPTP or top-two runoff.  i see no hope of accomplishing
>     voter reform that will be challenged or associated with abandoning
>     either of those two principles.
>
>     only Condorcet (assuming a Condorcet winner) can be laid against
>     the template of "Simple majority" and "one-person-one-vote" and
>     decide the election *consistently* with every hypothetical race
>     between two candidates.  what IRV sorta claimed; that it's
>     equivalent to the old way, but applies the old rules automatically
>     (IRV and Condorcet or any ranked-choice agree that the only
>     meaning to racking A above B is that this voter would vote for A
>     in traditional two-person race between A and B). this justifies
>     some people's support for IRV where it is opaque to every choice a
>     voter has below the first choice, until their first choice is
>     eliminated and some other choice is promoted.
>
>     but it's really Condorcet that accomplishes doing it the old way,
>     but using the "technology" of requiring of every voter to make up
>     their minds (as if that is such a hardship - to make up your mind
>     about the election by Election Day) about contingency votes (which
>     is what the ranked ballot does, but the Range and Approval ballots
>     do something else).
>
>     --
>
>     r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com <mailto:rbj at audioimagination.com>
>
>     "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
>     -----Original Message-----
>     From: "Jameson Quinn" [jameson.quinn at gmail.com
>     <mailto:jameson.quinn at gmail.com>]
>     Date: 08/22/2011 10:14
>     To: rbj at audioimagination.com <mailto:rbj at audioimagination.com>
>     CC: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>     <mailto:election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>     Subject: Re: [EM] Voting reform statement - new draft, please give
>     opinions
>
>     I appreciate RBJs analysis of a possible failure mode of approval.
>     Its true, if Approval were implemented and then repealed, that
>     would be a blow to voting reform.
>
>     However, for me, there are two problems with that.
>
>
>     1. We have ample evidence of voters rejecting IRV - for instance,
>     in the AV question in the UK. We do not have evidence of which
>     other system (Approval, Condorcet, or other) is least likely to be
>     rejected. RBJ believes that Condorcet is better, and therefore
>     safer against repeal, than Approval. Others might dispute either
>     or both of these contentions, and I dont see that we have the
>     empirical data to decide.
>
>
>     2. Reform has at least two failure modes. It can be implemented
>     and then rejected, as RBJ worries; or it can never be implemented
>     in the first place. Our inability as activists to agree on
>     anything, which would be highlighted if we cant agree on a
>     consensus statement, accentuates the possibility of the latter
>     failure.
>
>
>     2a. Id argue that while we cant know whether approval or Condorcet
>     is better proof against repeal, we can be pretty sure that
>     Approval is the most likely to get consensus from theorists. For
>     that, we have not just strong logical arguments (Approval is the
>     simplest system, and represents a step towards any better system);
>     we have empirical evidence.
>
>
>     Robert: I would be interested to hear your response to these points
>
>
>     JQ
>
>
>
>


-- 

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."