[EM] Voting reform statement

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell <jlundell at pobox.com>

> On Aug 15, 2011, at 8:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell <jlundell at pobox.com>
>
>> On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>> So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn
>> to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out
>> of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language.
>>
>>
>> Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of
>> approval. The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more
>> than two candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic
>> voting. That is, if my preference is A>B>C, then my decision whether to
>> approve B cannot be made without strategizing. That flies in the face of
>> your fine suggestion that strategy avoidance be an important criterion.
>>
>> (It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is "easy" or "obvious";
>> that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having
>> information not generally available about other voters' preferences and
>> strategies.)
>>
>
> Well, I specifically didn't make such a claim, because, although I believe
> it, I knew it would lose people.
>
> I would claim that approval strategy is at least as easy/obvious as
> plurality strategy; and that approval reacts at least as well to a lack of
> strategy as plurality.
>
>>
>> The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other
>> rating-based system).
>>
>
> You can believe that and still sign this statement, as long as you believe
> that approval is a worthwhile step up from plurality. Note that the
> statement nowhere claims that approval is better than IRV, just that it is
> likely to be able to get a broader consensus from theorists.
>
> Still... although you haven't actually said anything that contradicts what
> I wrote, you did say that I will lose you for endorsing approval, which
> makes me suspect that you also feel that approval is not a worthwhile step
> up from plurality. I'd love to convince you otherwise, but the most
> important thing is to get a worthwhile consensus statement. To me, any
> statement that can't flatly endorse even one system is meaningless, and I'd
> guess approval is probably the system which can get the broadest support,
> and also one of the few which has a real chance of being implemented for
> real-world political elections. Am I wrong? Would you, for instance, endorse
> SODA?
>
> Personally, I see voting reform as a step-by-step process. Yes, approval
> has unsatisfying aspects. But implementing approval is a clear step up from
> plurality; a clear step towards any system you might advocate; and a step
> that would give us useful empirical data to help decide which direction to
> go from there. I think that most voters would be wary of taking a larger
> leap, even to my one of my favored systems, which I think are among the
> simpler of the better options. And since the simpler, safer option of
> approval does exist, I can't even blame voters for that.
>
> So, the bottom line is: Jonathan, what do you suggest? Do you think that
> this statement would still be useful if we simply removed approval and thus
> made no clear policy suggestion? Do you think that there's some other system
> which could get broader support from this community than approval would? Or
> do you thing that a useful, broadly-supported statement is simply
> impossible? (Or do you see some other option which I don't?)
>
>
> I'm doubtful that such a statement is possible, at least if you want
> universal assent.
>

Not universal, just as broad as possible.

>
> If we grant for the sake of the argument that approval is strictly
> preferable to plurality (and I might argue with that), then I don't see the
> case for rejecting IRV out of hand. Sure, there are list members who are
> allergic to IRV, but it seems to me that the argument against
> strategy-intensive rules is at least as convincing (more so to me).
>

There are people here who have reasonable arguments that IRV is strictly
worse than plurality, and so will not sign any statement advocating it. You
are making a reasonable argument that to me says that Approval is only
marginally better than plurality. So I don't see how that precludes you from
being able to sign on to this statement.

Perhaps your argument is better than the anti-IRV argument, but that's not
the point here. We can certainly assume that it's impossible that everyone
here will agree on any statement of that form.


>
> In general, if the primary reason we're rejecting plurality is its strategy
> problems (and your three listed problems, honest results,
> strategy-resistance, and candidate incentives all fall into a strategy
> category, seems to me), then it's hard for me to see a strong motivation for
> advocating approval.
>

Again, broadest possible consensus. Approval is nobody's favorite (I think;
it certainly isn't mine), but it's a good next step, and something we can (I
hope) agree on.

JQ
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