[EM] Preferential Party List Method Proposal

[Dave Ketchum]

On Aug 13, 2011, at 11:31 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 6:21 PM, Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com 
> > wrote:
> Glad to see thinking, though we part company on some details.
>
> On Aug 13, 2011, at 5:25 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote:
>
> All current forms of party list proportional representation have  
> each voter cast a vote for a single party. I say this is inadequate  
> since a small party can be eliminated and hence denied any  
> representation (this is particularly relevant if the legislature has  
> a threshold). However, votes for a party that doesn't have  
> sufficient support to win any seats in the legislature are simply  
> wasted. Thus I propose an alternative method.
>
> That some party may get zero seats, that does NOT make their attempt  
> a pure waste:
> .    If they are growing, they are on the way - and a warning to  
> other parties that their apparent goals deserve more attention -  
> perhaps to be honored by those who do get seats.
>
> Under this system, we would in fact see greater support for small  
> parties since it is less of a gamble. Even IF my first choice  
> (probably a niche party) does not get a seat, my vote will be  
> eventually transferred to a party that *does* have a seat. This  
> means that I'm more likely to support my first choice to begin with.  
> (This isn't fool proof though in the original formulation ...  
> ranking other parties at all increases their weight which helps them  
> compete against my preferred niche party, I don't think this is a  
> huge vulnerability though and it can be solved by allowing greater  
> flexibility in rankings).

I read this as following the IRV approach that requires going back and  
rereading ballots to do such transfers.  MANY of us se this as failing  
too often.  We argue for the Condorcet approach that reads ballots,  
ONE time, into an N*N matrix for analysis.  Since parts of a district  
such as precincts can be read into matrices, then to be summed  
together, there is more opportunity for encouraging, and checking on,  
quality of counting.

Looking closer, winners do not have to be first choice - they simply  
need to be ranked above enough of their competition.
>
> I would base the voting and counting on the ranking we do in  
> Condorcet for single seats - same N*N matrix and whoever would be CW  
> be first elected, with next the one who would be CW if the first CW  
> was excluded.
> .     If the above could elect too many from any one party, exclude  
> remaining candidates from that party on reaching the limit.
> .     Note that the N*N matrix has value that does not often get  
> mentioned - it is worth studying as to pairs of candidates, besides  
> its base value of deciding the election.
>
>
> I'm sure I don't have to remind you a Condorcet Winner does not  
> always exist. I don't completely understand your description of your  
> method. How does it work with parties?

Condorcet methods accept that three or more candidates may be a cycle  
rather than one being a CW - and have to accept responsibility for  
deciding which cycle member shall be, effectively, CW.

Seemed simple to treat parties, rather than persons, as candidates.  I  
thought of parties being allowed to fill more than one seat and, for  
this, wanting to have multiple candidates such as G1, G2, and G3.

Even with this, seems like voters would want to identify the person  
holding a seat even if the seat's existence was identified with the  
party.
>
> Each voter votes for as many parties as they wish in a defined  
> order. My vote might be democrat>green>libertarian>republican or  
> something like that.
>
> Anyway, first we calculate each party's "weight". Weight is  
> calculated simply by counting the number of times the party appears  
> on a voter's ballot in any position (this should be reminiscent of  
> approval voting). Each party also has a status "hopeful", "elected",  
> or "disqualified".
>
> Next, pick your favorite allocation method. D'Hondt, Sainte-Laguë,  
> Largest Remainder, anything else you can think of, with or without a  
> threshold.
>
> We then use this allocation method to determine each party's mandate  
> if everyone voted for their first preference. If every hopeful party  
> has at least one seat, then all the hopeful parties are declared  
> elected. If at least one hopeful party has no seats at all, the  
> party with the lowest weight is disqualified, its votes are  
> redistributed, and the allocation is done again with the new list of  
> hopeful parties.
>
> I see "first preference" and think of avoiding IRV's problems -  
> which the above ranking attends to.
>
> I am assuming candidates identified with their parties, and parties  
> getting seats via their candidates getting seats.  Thus, once all  
> the seats get filled, remaining parties - due to their lack of  
> strong candidates - get no seats.
>
> My system does not have voters voting for candidates at all. In  
> fact, candidates needn't even exist (theoretically of course) for my  
> method to be well-defined. Instead people simply vote for parties,  
> with parties that can't get any seats dropped from the lowest weight  
> first. Making the system more candidate-centric could be done, but  
> my algorithm (or class of algorithms) is supposed to be a minimal,  
> easily analyzable change from non-preferential party list methods.
>
>
> This method has some advantages over traditional systems. People  
> would not be motivated to betray their favorite party for fear that  
> it will lack enough support to win any seats in the legislature and  
> hence their vote would be wasted. This method can also be slightly  
> modified into a cardinal method, with a voter's first choice being  
> defined as the highest rated party on their ballot remaining and  
> weight being calculated by the arithmetic mean of a party's rating à  
> la Range Voting. This class of voting method is probably compatible  
> with MMP, but I haven't yet worked out the details of how that would  
> work.
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