[EM] [CES #3369] SODA

[Warren Smith]

> SODA is extremely easy for the voters; in fact, no voting system is simpler to vote
--it is pretty simple, but it seems to me plain approval is simpler.
You're exaggerating.

> Under SODA, there is no need for dishonesty from individual voters. A voter can safely vote for any candidate that they honestly agree with, without fear of that vote being wasted; or safely vote an honest approval-style ballot, if they do not agree with any candidate's preference order.
--One can invent scenarios where "dishonest" SODA voting is
strategically forced,
i.e. you (as a voter) approve someone you like less than someone you
do not approve.  For example, in the 2 liberals vs 2 conservatives
scenario in first example of
   http://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat2.html
in a situation where the candidates all refuse to state preference
orders (or state orders you dislike).  Another example: it seems to me
in 3-candidate race with plurality-style
delegating votes SODA becomes equivalent to instant runoff voting with
3 pre-stated vote types. It then suffers all the paradoxes obtainable
from IRV via 3 vote types, e.g. favorite betrayal, and see
    http://www.rangevoting.org/CompleteIdioticIRV.html
This is true even if every voter honestly agrees with the 3 available
preference orders,
and noting that a vote "A>B>C" via delegation is "more honest" than a
vote such as
"approve A and B."

>SODA is easier to count and more fraud-resistant than most systems, including IRV. It also can be run on most voting machines, including even old and outdated systems.
--somewhat debatable.  It is certainly less easy to count than plain approval.
Fraud resistance? Well, it's immune to some kinds but not to other kinds.
Overall I'd say it probably offers more fraud opportunities than plain
plurality.



-- 
Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org  <-- add your endorsement (by clicking
"endorse" as 1st step)
and
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