[EM] Voting reform statement

[Jameson Quinn]

A few months ago, we had a discussion where several people supported the
idea of writing a common statement for people on this list to sign on to. I
said that I would write such a statement, but until now, I haven't. I
believe that, with the Rhode Island Voter Choice Commission about to be
seated, now is an opportune time to do so.

The statement below is my attempt to write something that I think will get
broad consensus here.* It is only a first draft and I expect it to change
significantly before we start to sign on to it.* I am probably being
overoptimistic about how much we can agree on. I'd welcome discussion of any
of the points below. Remember: the main objective here is not to convince
others to agree with you, but to find the most-useful statement on which you
can already agree. So once people have heard each side of a debate, if we
still don't agree on something, we just remove that from the statement or
present both sides; we should try to avoid getting sidetracked in endless
debates on specific points.

------------

The study of voting systems has made significant progress over the last
decade, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was 20 years
ago. One important place where that has happened is on the election methods
mailing list. This mailing list is likely to include the largest and most
diverse group of voting systems theorists in the world. It is a place where
opinions vary and debate is vigorous. Thus, we think that the broad, though
imperfect, consensus on the following ideas is worth paying attention to.

We believe that the voting systems currently used in most of the
English-speaking world, including single-round plurality voting (also termed
First Past the Post, FPTP) and single-member districts (aka seats, ridings,
or electorates), represent some of the worst voting systems known. We
believe that reforming these systems would provide important societal
benefits, and that there are clearly not corresponding reasons to oppose
such reform from the perspective of the public interest. We may disagree
about which specific reforms might provide the absolutely optimum results,
but we can nevertheless agree that there are a number of options which would
represent worthwhile improvements.

*Single-winner reform*

There are various criteria, both formally-defined and informal, by which one
can judge a voting system. These criteria can be divided into several
classes:

1. Honest-results-oriented criteria. These include such measures as Bayesian
regret (that is, simulated societal satisfaction), the majority criterion,
and the Condorcet criterion, which focus on whether the "correct" candidate,
according to some definition, is elected. Although these criteria in some
cases can favor different candidates as being "correct", in most practical
cases they agree.

2. Strategy-resistance criteria. Voting is a complex process, and inevitably
there are some cases where some group could get an advantage by changing
their votes.  It is desirable to keep such cases to a minimum. For one
thing, it's fairer not to reward such strategic voting behavior. But it's
not just that. Perhaps more importantly, a voting system which gives too
much of an incentive to strategic voters, can lead to widespread strategy
which systematically distorts the results.

3. Process-oriented criteria. These include such measures as simplicity of
the ballot, simplicity of the ballot-counting process, and feasibility of
auditing or other fraud-prevention measures.

4. Candidate-incentive criteria. Systems which encourage or discourage
"clone candidates"; give too much power to parties, as opposed to voters;
have problems here. These criteria also include less strictly-defined
concerns about the type of candidates and campaign strategies a system
encourages; for instance, systems which effectively reduce the field to 2
major candidates could encourage negative advertising.

There is a broad consensus among researchers plurality voting is among the
worst systems for honest results, for strategy-resistance, and for candidate
incentives. Honest voting can split votes among similar candidates,
"spoiling" the election and leading opposing candidates to win. Voters
respond by strategically choosing the "lesser evil" among the two major
candidates, which can lead to complacent candidates because even corrupt,
widely-disliked candidates can win. The system discourages candidates from
entering the race, and encourages negative advertising. Although plurality
has good simplicity and fraud-resistance, this is not enough to recommend
its use.

A number of proposed single-winner replacements for plurality exist.
Although theorists can not find consensus about which of these systems is
best, we can agree that many of them are clearly head-and-shoulders above
plurality. Systems advanced as as best by some of us, and accepted as good
by all of us, include (in categorical and alphabetical order):

   - Various *Bucklin* or median-based systems such as *Majority Judgment*
   - Various *Condorcet* systems, including *Condorcet//Approval, various
   Condorcet//IRV hybrids, Ranked Pairs, *and* Schulze*.
   - *Range Voting* (aka Score Voting)
   - *SODA voting*

Notably absent from the above list is IRV (aka Alternative Vote, or misnamed
as "Ranked Choice Voting"). IRV has some advocates who feel that its
property of "Later-no-harm", a strategy-resistance criterion, make it the
only good reform proposal. However, the signatories to this statement agree
that it is inferior to most of the systems above. Some of us find it
superior to Plurality, and thus would support IRV as a reform; some of us
find it as bad or worse, and would oppose it.

Still, even without IRV, the list above has too many options for the
average, unengaged voter to understand and choose between. Thus, our
advocacy for our various systems has had the tragically ironic result of
splitting the vote and ensuring Plurality voting's continued dominance. We
find this situation intolerable. Thus, we make two commitments:

   - All of us will support any of the above as practical reform, and
   endeavor to emphasize their advantages when talking to the public.
   - All of us will also unite to support *approval voting*, which can be
   seen as the simplest case of any one of the above-listed systems.

Approval voting simply means that voters may vote for as many candidates as
they wish. It is a clear improvement over plurality. The ballot format is
just as simple. It would reduce mistakenly invalid or "spoiled" ballots. It
would allow minor parties to show a realistic level of support, while still
ensuring that the actual winner had the broadest support.

Some have criticized approval on the basis that it would lead to
nearly-universal bullet voting. This is a criticism that we find flatly
ridiculous. First, for a large part of the electorate — those whose favorite
candidate is one of the two frontrunners — a bullet vote is entirely
appropriate, being both strategically and expressively adequate. Second, the
large majority of voters have become accustomed to voting for a "lesser
evil" when their favorite candidate is not a frontrunner. It is simply not
credible that voters who can betray their favorite in order to avoid
vote-splitting under plurality, would suddenly become such partisans that
they couldn't add a backup vote under approval.

*Proportional representation*
*
*
... I'll write this section later. Basically, I intend to follow the same
outline I used for the single-winner case: desirable criteria, flaws with
FPTP/single-member districts, variety of good answers (probably not a list,
because there are too many options), and then a commitment to support any
good option even if we can't agree on which is best. Anyone else is welcome
to make an attempt to write this, or to comment on how they'd change that
outline.

________

So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn
to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out
of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language.

Hopefully,
Jameson Quinn
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