[EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

Kristofer,

Stochastic methods should only be used in situations where all of the alternatives qualify for the job.

It should not be used for screening the candidates.

Forest 

----- Original Message -----
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm 
Date: Wednesday, November 17, 2010 4:35 am
Subject: Re: [EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules
To: fsimmons at pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com

> fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:
> > How did this thread get side tracked to Proportional Representation?
> > 
> > Proportional Representation only works for multi-winner elections.
> > 
> > Of course, everybody knows that PR is the way to go in multi-
> winner elections. 
> > And why is that? Because it solves the tyranny of the 
> majority problem in that
> > setting. 
> > 
> > So why cannot we see that this same problem exists in single 
> winner elections? I
> > suggest that the analogous remedy in the single winner setting 
> is proportional
> > probability. The simplest method that accomplishes this is 
> random ballot. But,
> > as I suggested, there are better stochastic methods that yield 
> probability> distributions with less entropy while still solving 
> the tyranny of the majority
> > problem..
> 
> An assembly picked by PR stabilizes itself because the 
> differently 
> positioned candidates balance each other out and actually meet 
> and 
> discuss. If the assembly rules have supermajority rules, that 
> may also 
> make it more likely to reach a consensus rather than oscillating 
> between 
> extreme positions.
> 
> On the other hand, in a single-winner election, there is only 
> one 
> winner. That winner usually won't have an "inner assembly" to 
> balance 
> himself. Thus, I think that the reaction against 
> nondeterministic 
> methods arise from the thought that if we can't be sure who will 
> win, 
> the candidate who wins might win simply by the luck of the draw 
> and be 
> unsuitable - and then we're stuck with him without other council 
> members 
> to moderate him.
> 
> Abd's 10% example is an example of this. If 10% think 
> [disastrous 
> policy] is really good and votes accordingly, then by using 
> Random 
> Ballot, you'd get that disastrous policy 10% of the time. While 
> Random 
> Ballot may find a brilliant policy that only 10% knows of, it 
> can't 
> discern between that and a horrible policy that (rightly) no 
> more than 
> 10% support, and the loss from the latter would more than 
> outweigh the 
> gain from the former.
> 
> Or so one would argue.
> 
> In a low-entropy method, as far as I understand it, there still 
> has to 
> be a random component that encourages the voters to find a 
> compromise. 
> If the fallback component is too close to a deterministic 
> method, then 
> the majority won't care to try and find a consensus because 
> they'll 
> benefit more from the fallback. On the other hand, if it's too 
> random, 
> it could be bad indeed if the different groups truly can't find 
> a 
> compromise.
>