[EM] Who is your representative under Asset Voting?

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 12:30 AM 11/17/2010, Jan Kok wrote:
>On Tue, Nov 16, 2010 at 8:33 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
><abd at lomaxdesign.com> wrote:
> >> - If you vote for someone who gets more than the quota, then the
> >> excess votes get passed on to help elect other candidates. So who did
> >> you elect? Who is your representative?
> >
> > You elected your representative, the one you voted for, or the one your
> > representative voted for. The contingency that your 
> representative votes for
> > more than one exists, but can be handled. I think it will probably be rare.
> > If I have N votes to assign, I can gain maximum access to one whom I choose
> > and give all my votes to, than by distributing them. I then distribute my
> > influence, diluting it and making it less significant.
>
>Suppose I as an elector have .4 of quota and am forced to give away my
>assets and drop out. And suppose there are two candidates C and D that
>I'm happy with who each have .8 of quota. I could give all my assets
>to C and let him distribute the excess to whoever he wants (which
>might not be D). Or I could split my assets and push both C and D over
>the top.

Yes, you can do either. Both are rational under some circumstances. 
If you value the two candidates equally, if you have difficulty 
deciding which you favor, you could indeed give half your votes to 
one and half to the other. However, if you do this, you will have 
less obvious influence. That is, the "problem" that you create for 
your constituent you also create for yourself. If you give all your 
votes to one, all three know that there is a specific representative 
elected through the vote (and, in addition, 0.2 quota given to 
another). This is more likely to maximize your ability, and your 
client's ability through you, to access the assembly, not so much 
through threat of withholding your vote, but through the ability to 
be heard. If there is a seat who got 0.4 quota from you, it would be 
collossally stupid to not listen to you! What this would do is to 
spread the deliberative process through a broader number of virtual 
representatives who filter communication, so that the assembly is not 
overloaded, and individual voters know who to talk to if they have concerns.

For me, this is a type of FA/DP application.

In the contingency of the elector splitting the vote, the voter still 
knows what power was exerted by the vote. It's measureable. If the 
two seats vote identically on an issue of concern to the voter, the 
effect is the same as if the votes had been given to one. However, if 
they vote differently, it is, for that issue, almmost as if the vote 
were wasted. However, note: this is a conservative effect, indicating 
a lack of assembly consensus, those two votes count for quorum, but 
tend to suppress the passage of the related issue by a majority. To 
the extent that this is widespread among seats, it will encourage 
further negotiation in the assembly.

To top this off, consider the contingency that the seats vote 
differently. Suppose that this is open asset, i.e., the electors may 
stil cast votes, perhaps remotely, on non-privileged questions before 
the Assembly. The elector may still vote, if this is a matter of 
concern for the elector. The elector is the true representative of 
the voter, and electors simply choose who will represent them in the 
assembly, primarily for purposes of access to the motion and debate 
process. Actual decision-making right is reserved to the electors, 
but they may routinely delegate this, and the system, as I'd have it, 
assumes that delegation with the vote assignments.

>Wouldn't you rather have TWO "representatives"?

Maybe. More often, no. Two is less than one. That is, if one, I have 
a full vote of "access." With two, I have a ha;f-vote of access. The 
problem is that the benefit of access is inversely exponential to the 
vote strength. It's easy to see at the extremes.

If they are not busy, a legislator will listen to and discuss issues 
with a single voter, representing nobody but himself or herself. More 
often, they have staff to listen to concerns. If consitutents 
actually try to, in numbers, discuss an issue with an elected 
representative, they will find themselves, often, frustrated. Asset 
voting would help to resolve this well-known problem of scale in 
democracy, and it is a benefit to both sides of this, the top level 
and the bottom level.

>My point is that in any PR system, I don't think it makes sense to say
>that you have exactly _one_, specific "representative". And I don't
>think it matters.

First of all, "exactly" is quite an exaggeration of what I wrote. I'd 
say, instead, that there is a benefit to knowing "substantially" who 
was elected, but that benefit will not always be realized. Just 
usually and substantially. Regardless, in *any case*, the voter can 
tell what the effect of the vote was, precisely, i.e., it was a part 
of the quota of X, or it was divided between X and Y, or, quite 
rarely I'd think, between more than that. Every vote counts. This is 
not true for any other proportional representation system that I've 
seen. (But Asset is a tweak on voting systems like STV-PR, fixing the 
basic problem of STV-PR that Carroll saw, so far back.)

>What I think is important is being able to get your ideas put in front
>of the legislature. You want access to whichever legislators might be
>friendly to your ideas. With Asset Voting, as you point out, your best
>bet is to go through your elector, who can send your idea up through
>the lattice of electors to an elected representative.

Bingo. And the elected representatives do know where they got their 
votes. In the example described, if a single choice is made, allowing 
the seat extra votes to distribute -- it's a simple option, and one 
simply gives all the votes to the most trusted possibility -- you 
have created, by voting for the elector, increased access for 
yourself. That might go through a chain, but each link in the chain 
gathers strength. Long chain, you have the advantage of someone who 
is probably very accessible to you at the bottom. Short chain, you 
have more direct access, but more risk of being unable to access the 
first link.

Voters will adjust how they vote according to what works best for 
them. The basic principle, though, is simple: vote for the person you 
want to be your connection to the Assembly. Vote for someone 
inaccessible, you've shot yourself in the foot. You may think this 
person is the Messiah, fine. But if you want to be able to talk to 
the Messiah, perhaps to ask questions! -- wouldn't you? -- you may 
need an intercessor if this Messiah is human.

Now, suppose you give all your 0.4 quota to one candidate with 0.8 
already, electing that seat. You are like money in the bank for that 
seat. I.e., the seat could lose 0.2 quota and retain the seat. The 
seat gives the 0.2 quota to another seat. That is, there is now a 
seat with special influence with another seat. You, as an elector 
with highly visible and significant support, have access to your own 
seat -- the one you voted for -- and influence through that seat with 
another seat. That other seat will also know that your seat was able 
to give that 0.2 vote to him or her because of your 0.4 quota vote transfer.

Your net gain is likely higher than if you split your vote. The 
second seat would talk to you if you ask. You just don't choose directly.

You do have a third option, you know. You can talk to the one you are 
contemplating giving the 0.4 quota to and ask to whom they will give 
the vote. You can decide if this is acceptable to you, and make your 
decision accordingly.

Asset is not simply a voting system, it sets up a deliberative 
process. It is deliberative process that is the bedrock of democracy, 
not voting, which is merely a test, determining readiness to make a 
decision and making it when warranted.

Direct democracy is deprecated because it is impossible for the 
general electorate to be adequately informed, most of the time. 
Absentee voting is generally discouraged in assemblies because the 
voter is not present with the debate. While proxy voting is 
effectively what seats do when it comes to voting, the structure, as 
I see it, encourages participation at all levels. You, as an elector, 
if direct voting by electors is allowed -- and I see no reason to not 
allow it, though it is, indeed, a radical reform -- decide if you are 
sufficiently informed to vote intelligently or not. Given that you 
can choose someone whom you most trust to vote for you, routinely, I 
don't think that you will habitually vote directly. But if you have 
enough votes, you might.

That is, electors form a penumbra of involved citizens, freely chosen 
by the voters in the asset election, who may become involved in 
assembly business, follow all the hearings they choose to follow, 
become as informed as they can, and who can vote directly. They can 
discuss their findings with their seat, if they have enough votes to 
gain privileged access, or even if they only represent themselves. At 
least the seat knows that they voted for him or her!

What the Asset election really does is to select, voluntarily, a full 
citizen assembly. Anyone can join this by registering as an elector 
candidate, and presumably they vote for themselves -- there is no 
reason not to if you are willing to register -- so this is very close 
to direct democracy, but with tweaks that avoid the dangers of mob 
rule, that confer the benefits of representative democracy, necessary 
because of the scale, without losing the benefits of voluntary 
participation. If you have time, and are willing to risk reprisals, 
you become an elector, you lose only your trivial registration fee. 
If you are too poor to pay the fee, and can't get someone to pay it 
for you, then probably you should, until the next election, focus in 
improving your situation! You can still participate indirectly 
through the elector you vote for.

>So there could be an advantage for electors to distribute assets to
>multiple candidates. If C doesn't like your idea, maybe D will.

But, if C gave the excess votes to D -- and if this is important to 
you, you can be assured it will happen: "I will give you my 0.4 quota 
if you will give the excess to D" -- then you have the benefit of 
increased access to D as well -- the same 0.2 quota, as if you gave 
it directly, if your conditional vote was open, but the effect would 
be clear from the voting record anyway -- you have that same access.

As a high-level elector, with 0.4 quota, you could probably gain 
privileged access to any seat, in fact, except for those who would 
consider you repugnant! You are a huge part of the electoral body 
that selects seats. You would be a political force, greater than most 
present lobbyists. You could, if you decided to, deliver 40% of 
what's needed to get elected. Legally!

Asset makes campaigning, my guess, obsolete. Rather, to get elected 
to the assembly, become an elector, become active, be visible with 
the work you do, and be accessible to your constituents or those who 
might be or might become your constituents. Serve your public better 
than others, listen to them, learn from them, and represent them. You 
don't need money.

It is possible to have a voluntary poll tax, that would be 
distributed to the electors according to the votes received. This 
could be kept by electors for their own expenses and as for 
compensation for what they do. (Beyond expenses, this would be 
taxable income, I'd assume, like any other compensation for work 
done, though it's possible that there would be an exempt amount, a 
non-taxable floor.)

Electors could also collect contributions directly. I'd require this 
to be disclosed, any amounts over a threshhold.

Details.

Bottom line: think about how the whole system would work. Thinking in 
terms of present practice and necessities won't cut it. Asset really 
is a radical reform.

What I'm promoting, first, is the use of Asset for organizational 
elections. It's cheap, it's easy, and it is effective. It's a hybrid 
between secret ballot and open election.

>  And if
>D doesn't, maybe E or F (who I like but who were already elected by
>the time I had to distribute my assets) would be interested.

Sure. What isn't necessary obvious to people at first is that the 
seats aren't where the fundamental power is. The power is in the 
electoral college, if it retains the right to vote directly. The 
members of the electoral college use their voting power to ensure 
that they have access when they need it to the assembly floor. They 
have access proportionally, roughly, to their voting power.

But any seat can choose to listen to any elector.

The seats are only a way to filter assembly business to that approved 
by the seats. To get a motion to the floor, you need the support of 
two seats, one to make the motion and one to second it, and then you 
need to be sure that the arguments necessary for passage (or 
rejection, on the other side) are presented. My guess is that direct 
voting would only be allowed on the main floor, not in commmitte. 
Committees only make recommendations.

What I expect most people would want to do is to first try Asset 
without the direct voting process. That may be good, but there is 
also a risk. Direct voting reduces the power of the seats, in effect, 
though my guess is that actual reversal of assembly decisions through 
direct voting would be unusual. To change the process to allow direct 
voting could require the assent of the seats, which involves them 
voting against what may be their personal power. Don't be surprised 
if it's difficult to change!

Still, if the electors, who are a limited group, decide, as a group, 
to change the system, they have access to the power to do that. Next 
election.... And if the voters think the electors are out to lunch, 
there could be a massive shift the next Asset election.

A lot depends on the details. But for organizational elections, this 
is so simple and so likely to create boards that truly represent the 
members, that it is well worth trying.