[EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 08:57 AM 11/16/2010, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>Condorcet doesn't give proportional representation. If you have an 
>example like:
>
>51: D1 > D2 > D3 > D4
>49: R1 > R2 > R3 > R4
>
>and pick the first four, all the Ds will win.

Just for fun, suppose this is STV, to elect 5 seats. Accurate 
proportionality is not possible, but it can get close. I will assume 
acccurate vote transfers. As an exercise, I will use the Hare quota, 
20 votes, and then look at what Asset would do.

This turns, below, into a general discussion of Asset Voting, which 
was originally proposed as a tweak on STV, in 1883, by Lewis Carroll 
(Charles Dodgson).

The seats chosen are:

1. D1.
2. R1
3. D2
4. R2

leaving

11: D3 > D4
9: R3 > R4

Nobody has a quota for the fifth seat. This is why the Droop quota is 
used in most implementations of STV. But let's go back to Dodgson's idea.

D1 now owns 11 votes that remain, and R1 owns 9. If they can agree, 
they can elect a seat. If they cannot agree, my proposal for the 
rules is that the seat is vacant until they do, or until a special 
election is held. I think that leaving the seat open may be superior 
to a special election, but if a special election is held, it should 
be one that would find a compromise candidate. It should not be IRV! 
It should not be a partisan election, party affiliation should not be 
on the ballot, my opinion.

Note this: generally it requires an assembly majority to elect a 
chair, and the chair has a tiebreaker vote, only votes if there is a 
tie. To elect a chair, the members must agree, at least one person 
from one faction must agree with both from the other.

It is, in fact, very precise proportional representation, given the 
full rules involved. They can agree on a fifth seat, creating someone 
perceived as fair and neutral, who can break ties, or they can elect 
a chair who will do the same. The best course, overall, is to do 
both, because, then, if a member is missing for some reason, 
tiebreaking by a fair and neutral chair remains.

Effectively, they elect two persons perceived as neutral or moderate 
to help them when they are deadlocked.

STV with a Hare quota, as described, is rigorously proportional. With 
the Droop quota, we end up 3:2 in the assembly, which is 
substantially more power for the Ds than the votes represented.

Full-on asset voting is even better, and can be accurate no matter 
what the number of voters and seats to be elected is. If direct 
voting by electors is allowed, it can be effectively proportional 
even if only two or three seats are elected!

What is the difference between asset voting, with direct elector 
voting allowed, and direct democracy or pure delegable proxy, open 
meeting? It's the election of seats that have full participation 
rights, so the assembly can be small enough for practical 
deliberation. In other words, Asset, even if direct voting by 
electors is allowed, retains the necessary value of representative 
democracy. Electors, I assume, under assembly rules, would not be 
able to introduce motions or to debate them. But they could still 
vote, if they care to. They would not ordinarily vote, I believe, 
because it would mostly be a waste of time. But not a waste because 
it would have no value, but because, usually, their position would be 
represented well enough by those they elected, already. The direct 
voting allows for exceptions.

Once Asset is in place, even as a tweak to STV/Hare, voters will come 
to realize that they can vote for *anyone* who makes themselves 
available for the ballot, and is allowed on the ballot. (Or 
write-ins, if allowed.) The process will become far less predictable, 
and, in this case, that's good. The people can actually and 
effectively speak, through chosen representatives, chosen without opposition.

STV/Droop would also work with Asset. It is important to keep the 
quota fixed. I.e., the counting process should seek the PR equivalent 
of an absolute majority, not a majority of unexhausted votes. If all 
candidates have been ranked -- as Australia requires -- then the 
election will complete. It is also possible that full-ranking ballots 
from all candidates could be collected before the election, and used 
to determine the last seat(s), that would be part of being a 
candidate, and would be published before the election.

That has an interesting consequence. Voters can just vote for their 
candidate, and know exactly how their vote will be treated. But if 
they disagree with their favorite, they can modify the sequence. 
Their vote will count either way, it gives them absolute freedom.

In full-on, open ballot Asset, I'd require registration of candidates 
in any case. There will be huge numbers of them, eventually. In 
essence, anyone can become an elector, a public voter, by 
registering, which should be cheap, the registration fee should cover 
listing of the name in a pamphlet available to voters, giving names, 
minimal information about the candidate (like town of residence), the 
approval of a political party if relevant, in the pamphlet, which 
would not be expensive per candidate. I'd be astonished if it were 
over $10. Then, as a voter, if you have registered as an eligible 
elector, you can insure your becoming one by voting for yourself. 
Probably using a unique code that would be printed in the ballot and 
with ballot design allowing easy reading of the vote, even though 
there might be thousands of possibilities.

For continuity with present practice, I'd have the ballot still allow 
candidate names, of candidates who specially qualify, and I might 
even allow that to be a relatively small number, perhaps no more than 
twice the number of seats to be elected plus one. But, then, there 
would be an open voting position allowing entry of the elector code

It might be required for electors to cast a separate, identified 
ballot before the election. This would be used in the event that the 
elector becomes unavailable. Another possibility, to address possible 
security concerns under some conditions, would be to require that 
electors, to be able to participate further, would need to obtain a 
certain minimum number of votes. But I won't address that here, and 
would only recommend this where widespread vote coercion was a real 
possibility. The number should be large enough that it is 
economically efficient to provide all such electors with police 
protection. Being an elector, though, requires bravery. If it's that 
difficult, voters should agree privately to support a single person, 
and give that person their power, and that person, through a 
proxy-like process or ballot as mentioned, designates effective successors.

True proportional representation is needed to allow an elected 
assembly to negotiate serious social divisions. A majoritarian 
government can be a disaster in those circumstances. Majoritarian 
systems in the U.S. led to the Civil War, a huge disaster, and one 
which, contrary to common perception, did not resolve the issues 
raised by slavery. Lysander Spooner was right (strongly against 
slavery, strongly against the war), and most countries managed to 
address and eliminate slavery without civil war.

Genuine democracy is about trying to find a way for everyone to win. 
Majority rule is inferior to that (hence the common perception among 
range voting advocates that range's MC failure is an asset, not a 
defect), but remains superior to minority rule. The key is to allow 
intelligent participation in deliberative process, which is never 
fixed in outcome to a limited set of predetermined choices.

(Requiring supermajorities for decisions always leads to effective 
minority rule when the status quo favors a minority. That is why 
majority rule remains important as a deciding principle. Standard 
deliberative process generally requires supermajorities to end 
debate, so it does seek more than simply majority rule, it takes care 
to see that there has been adequate discussion. But the majority 
remains able to decide, in an emergency, to cut off debate. That's 
quite dangerous, which is why, in the U.S. Senate, this is called the 
"nuclear option." It is widely known as a hazard. The restraint is 
under attack, for partisan reasons. If the cloture rule is going to 
be dismantled, we would be moving toward pure majority rule, which is 
unstable.)